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ABSTRACT
RICHARD T. SKARBEZ: Plausibility Illusion in Virtual Environments
(Under the direction of Mary C. Whitton and Frederick P. Brooks, Jr.)
Historically, research into subjective user experience in virtual environments has focused
on presence, the feeling of “being there” in the virtual environment. Recently, Professor Mel
Slater proposed that in addition to this feeling of being in the virtual space, researchers also
need to consider the subjective feeling that the events depicted in the virtual environment ap-
pear real. He coined the terms Place Illusion (PI) and Plausibility Illusion (Psi), respectively,
to refer to these subjective feelings.
There exists a substantial amount of previous research applicable to PI, but very little
regarding Psi. This dissertation fleshes out the concept of Plausibility Illusion by introduc-
ing new terminology, and reports on several experiments investigating the factors and effects
of Psi. I demonstrate that Psi can be detected using existing presence measures, including
questionnaires and physiological metrics. Of particular interest in these results is that fac-
tors contributing to Plausibility Illusion affected heart rate, with inconsistent behavior of the
virtual environment leading to increased heart rate. I also demonstrate that study partici-
pants’ individual differences affected how they interacted with a virtual environment, leading
to different levels of Plausibility Illusion and, therefore, presence. I further demonstrate that,
among the factors tested, the virtual body is the most important factor contributing to users’
feelings of Plausibility Illusion, and that the coherence of the virtual scenario is the second
most important factor. This shows it is feasible to determine a rank ordering of factors that
affect users’ sense of Plausibility Illusion in virtual environments, offering guidance to creators
and developers.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction - Evaluating Virtual Experiences
Virtual environments (VEs) are tremendously sophisticated human-computer interfaces
that are used for a wide variety of applications. Examples include psychological treatment,
psychological research, military and medical training, entertainment, and sociological re-
search. Each of these applications has different task requirements and objectives, and suggests
different hardware or software implementations. Additionally, there is no consistent defini-
tion for what constitutes an effective VE. For these reasons, there does not yet exist a single,
generalizable metric that can be used to determine whether a given VE is a success or not.
It is possible to identify specific measures that determine the effectiveness of a particular
VE. For example, if a VE is developed to train participants to complete an assembly task,
one could create tests of that training, e.g., number of units assembled per unit time, number
of errors per unit time, percentage of units correctly assembled. One could then develop
a controlled experiment where some participants are trained using the VE and some are
trained using whatever the traditional technique is. Then, when both sets of users are tested
post-training, these measures would give some concrete evidence for whether the VE was
effective at training. Such formal training transfer studies are rarely done, however, due to
the time, effort, and cost required. Even if they were done, though, they would not enable
the comparison of results among different VEs designed for different purposes.
The development of generalizable measures of VE effectiveness, then, remains an open
research problem. One such concept, that of presence, has been driving VE research for
decades.
1.2 Presence
Presence has been defined and operationalized in many ways by different researchers (see
Chapter 2 for a more thorough overview of presence research), but it is most commonly
defined as something akin to the feeling of “being there” in a virtual place. One example
comes from Witmer and Singer, who defined presence as “the subjective experience of being
in one place or environment, even when one is physically situated in another” (Witmer and
Singer, 1998).
Presence has the distinct advantage of being a metric applicable to any VE. One can
reasonably ask how present a user was in any given VE A, and then ask how present the user
was in some VE B, and if the user reports more presence in VE A, then that is some evidence
that enables the comparison of VEs A and B, though they may represent entirely different
scenarios and be designed for entirely different purposes.
While conceptually appealing, the evaluation procedure described in the previous para-
graph has several very important flaws. First is that determining “how present” a user is is in
itself a very difficult problem. Presence is what the philosophy literature calls a quale (plural
qualia), which is defined as a subjective and internal feeling elicited by sense perceptions. This
subjective and internal nature makes measurement of presence (or any quale) extremely dif-
ficult. The predominant method has been to use one or more post-experiment questionnaires
to measure presence, but this is itself problematic. (See Chapter 2 for an overview of presence
questionnaires and the difficulties associated with using them.) There have been efforts to
develop objective correlates of presence, including physiological (Meehan et al., 2002) and
behavioral (Freeman et al., 2000) measures, but these are also flawed, requiring the addition
or modification of elements of the VE to enable measurement of presence.
For example, the most common physiological surrogate for presence is arousal, which
can be detected using measures of heart rate or skin conductance. The change in heart
rate associated with the onset of a stressful stimulus was shown by Meehan to correlate
with presence (Meehan et al., 2002). However, adding a stressful stimulus to a non-stressful
training task may violate the ecological validity of the training. Or, if a task also involves
physical exertion, it may not be possible to distinguish the effect of the stressful stimulus
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from the heart rate changes associated with the exertion. Therefore, while physiological and
behavioral metrics are promising, they are not one-size-fits-all solutions.
In Meehan’s dissertation he posits an ideal measurement of presence that would be reliable,
i.e., producing repeatable results, both within and between subjects; valid, i.e., demonstrated
to correlate with the subjective feeling of presence; multi-level-sensitive; and objective (Mee-
han, 2001). I would go further and suggest that such an ideal metric should also be measur-
able contemporaneously, continually, and without modification to the scenario. No measure
of presence yet exists that meets all of these criteria and is also generalizable across VEs.
A second important flaw, beyond the difficulty inherent in measuring presence, is that it
has not been conclusively demonstrated that more presence is a good thing. Welch argues
powerfully that there is no inherent reason to think that more presence leads to improved
task performance in a VE (Welch, 1999), and experimental results linking presence and task
performance are mixed (Witmer and Singer, 1998)(Slater et al., 1996).
So, presence is defined and operationalized in many different and occasionally conflicting
ways, is inherently difficult to measure (and there are many different measures), and may not
actually correlate with what one actually cares about in a VE in the first place. To address
some of these concerns, Slater proposed a theory that presence is composed of two orthogonal
components, Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion, and that together these factors will enable
a user to react-as-if-real (RAIR) while in a VE (Slater, 2009). For many applications, eliciting
RAIR from users is in fact what it means for a VE to be effective.
1.3 Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion
In 2009, Slater introduced the concepts of Place Illusion (PI) and Plausibility Illusion
(Psi) as the two constructs that contribute to realistic response in virtual environments. He
defined PI as, “the . . . illusion of being in a place in spite of the sure knowledge that you are
not there,” and Psi as, “the illusion that what is apparently happening is really happening
(even though you know for sure that it is not)” (Slater, 2009). PI, then, corresponds to the
traditional conception of presence as “being there”, while Psi represents an entirely different
conception of presence, that of believing what you are seeing. For example, assume you are
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in a VE is intended to represent a library. Here, presence would be your feeling of, “I am in
a real library.” If you turned your head and saw more bookshelves, that would reinforce your
feeling of PI. If all the library patrons were being quiet, that would reinforce your feeling of
Psi. Contrarily, if you turned your head and the imagery didn’t change, that would break PI,
and if patrons were yelling loudly in the library, that would break Psi.
1.4 Thesis Statement
In this dissertation,
1. I usefully elaborate Slater’s concept of Plausibility Illusion with the auxiliary concepts
of virtual scenarios, coherence, and reasonable circumstances, and
2. I describe experiments that have shown the following:
• Plausibility Illusion can be detected using existing presence measures,
• Plausibility Illusion is impacted by individual differences,
• The virtual body is the most important contributing factor to Plausibility Illusion,
and
• The coherence of the scenario is the second most important factor, among those
tested.
In this chapter, as well as in Chapters 2 and 3, I define several concepts related to Plausi-
bility Illusion, most notably virtual scenarios, coherence and reasonable circumstances, which
enable the discussion of Plausibility Illusion with its own vocabulary as a parallel concept to
Place Illusion.
Chapter 2 reviews and summarizes the existing presence literature, and categorizes ex-
isting thinking about components of presence using the Place Illusion/Plausibility Illusion
framework.
Chapter 3 fleshes out the concepts of Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion, in particu-
lar, commenting on several existing questions regarding virtual environments that could be
productively addressed by considering Plausibility Illusion.
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In Chapter 4, I present the results of an experiment that strongly suggests that participant
motivation is one of the individual differences that impacts Psi.
In Chapter 5, I demonstrate that existing presence measures—namely, the Witmer and
Singer Presence Questionnaire (PQ), the Slater-Usoh-Steed questionnaire (SUS), and phys-
iological measures of arousal—can be affected by various factors believed to influence both
Place Illusion, Plausibility Illusion, and the interaction of the two. The proposed interaction
is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Illustration of the proposed interaction of immersion, coherence, Place Illusion,
Plausibility Illusion, and presence
In Chapter 6, I demonstrate that participants may interact differently with a virtual
environment, specifically in a virtual football-playing task, and that these differences are
reflected in participants’ order of selected improvements in the virtual environment as well as
their reported presence on the SUS questionnaire.
In Chapter 6, I also demonstrate that participants who were directed to improve their
level of Plausibility Illusion overwhelmingly chose to improve their virtual bodies over other
available improvements to the virtual scenario. This shows that the virtual body is the
most important component of a virtual scenario for eliciting Plausibility Illusion, and also
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demonstrates the feasibility of determining whether some aspects of a virtual scenario are
more important than others for the purpose of eliciting Plausibility Illusion.
1.5 Definitions
To aid the reader, this section defines several terms and phrases frequently used throughout
this dissertation. Some of these are taken from the literature, but others—virtual scenarios,
reasonable and unreasonable circumstances, coherence—are my own.
In this dissertation, a virtual scenario (also scenario) is specifically the virtual environment
and the behavior of that environment. A virtual recreation of a historic site without any
characters or interactable objects would be a virtual environment, but not a virtual scenario.
If there were also virtual humans populating that environment, or objects in the environment
that could be manipulated, it would be a virtual scenario.
Sensorimotor contingencies are the regularities in how sensory stimulation depends on
the activity of the perceiver (O’Regan and Noe¨, 2001). For example, if one leans toward a
particular object, it takes up more of their field of vision.
A valid action is any action a VE user can take that results in a change to the state
of the virtual environment (an effective valid action) or to her perception of the virtual
environment (a sensorimotor valid action) (Slater, 2009). Note that an action can be both
effective and sensorimotor: for example, if a participant has a fully-body-tracked avatar
and takes a step to change his viewpoint in the environment (a sensorimotor action), he
also changes the location of the avatar model in the environment (an effective action). In
fact, under normal circumstances in the real world, physical movements are always both
sensorimotor and effective. In virtual environments, it is possible for an action to be a valid
sensorimotor action but not a valid effective action (moving one’s head in a VE where there
is head tracking but no user-controlled virtual body), or vice versa (moving one’s body when
it is controlling a fully-body-tracked avatar but the view is from a third-person perspective
on a stationary desktop display).
The immersion of a VE system is the set of all valid actions supported by that VE
system(Slater, 2009). A VE system that is less immersive (or has lower immersion) than
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another, more immersive (higher immersion) system can be simulated by the second system,
but not vice versa. A trivial example would be that a system that provides two buttons for
user input is more immersive than a system that provides only one button. Or for a more
real-world example, a system that uses a head-tracked HMD for display is more immersive
than a stationary desktop (“fishtank”) VE system, as the former could be used to simulate
the latter, but not vice versa.
In this dissertation, a reasonable circumstance is a state of affairs in a virtual scenario
that is self-evident given prior knowledge. This knowledge can come from the real world (for
example, if objects in the VE seem to be affected by gravity in the same way they would
be in the real world), or from within the VE (for example, if two characters start to fight
immediately upon meeting each other, after the user has previously been told that the two
are feuding). Objects can behave reasonably—a rock that is kicked can move like it would on
the real Earth, a teleporter can make a box blink out of existence—and characters can behave
reasonably—a man can wave and say hello when you walk past, a wizard can converse with a
dragon. Unreasonable circumstances are the opposite, that is, they are states of affairs that
are inconsistent with prior knowledge.
The coherence of a virtual scenario is the set of reasonable circumstances that can be
demonstrated by the scenario without introducing unreasonable circumstances. A more co-
herent (or higher coherence) virtual scenario can demonstrate the same amount or more
reasonable circumstances while demonstrating the same amount or fewer unreasonable cir-
cumstances than a less coherent (or lower coherence) version of the same scenario. That
is, all else being equal, it can demonstrate a greater number of reasonable circumstances,
fewer unreasonable circumstances, or both. If one assumes that demonstrating reasonable
circumstances is more difficult than demonstrating unreasonable circumstances, this enables
the same partial ordering relationship for coherence that is defined for immersion. That is, a
higher coherence scenario can “simulate” a lower coherence version of the scenario by artifi-
cially injecting unreasonable circumstances or “turning off” some reasonable circumstances,
but not vice versa.
Place Illusion (PI) is the illusion of being in a place in spite of the sure knowledge that
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you are not there (Slater, 2009).
Plausibility Illusion (Psi) is the illusion that what is apparently happening is really hap-
pening, in spite of the sure knowledge that it is not (Slater, 2009).
A quale (plural qualia), is a subjective and internal feeling elicited by sense perceptions.
Place Illusion, Plausibility Illusion, and presence are all qualia. Immersion and coherence, on
the other hand, are not.
1.6 Summary of experimental results
(Note: The first three experiments—described in Chapters 4 and 5—were performed at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The final experiment—described in Chapter
6—was performed at the Universitat de Barcelona.)
The first experiment (Coherence of virtual human interactions) involved 32 medical stu-
dent participants who conducted an interview with a virtual human patient. Each participant
experienced the virtual human in either a high-coherence or low-coherence condition. In both
conditions, the virtual human was controlled by an experimenter in a Wizard of Oz (WoZ) con-
figuration. In the high-coherence condition, the virtual human responded to the participant
as quickly and accurately as possible. In the low-coherence condition, the virtual human’s
responses included a variety of conversational errors introduced according to a script. There
was a marked difference between the two groups in their head-tracking logs—participants who
interacted with the low-coherence virtual patient looked at the patient less—however, there
was no difference in their abilities to perform the task or their ratings of the virtual patient.
This suggests that high user motivation may be able to compensate for a deficit in coherence.
The second experiment (Immersion and Coherence in the Pit) involved 32 participants
in the Pit, a virtual visual cliff environment. The scenario was presented with one of two
levels for each of two factors in a 2x2 design: field of view (as a system characteristic affecting
immersion) and behavioral realism, in the form of instructions being true or not (as a char-
acteristic of the scenario affecting coherence). These factors were chosen to elicit differences
in PI and Psi, respectively. This experiment failed to identify any metrics that could dis-
tinguish between PI effects and Psi effects. Analysis identified several possible reasons why
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the experiment failed to generate a result, even if PI and Psi are in fact distinguishable in
outcome measures. The most likely reason was that the factor levels in the experiment were
not sufficiently different, so that individual differences obscured any effect of the experimen-
tal conditions. In particular, this experiment varied only one parameter each for immersion
(field of view) and coherence (correctness of experimental instructions), while each of these are
certainly multidimensional constructs. As justification, consider that immersion must at the
very least consider sensorimotor contingencies for each of the sensory modalities supported by
the VE, and coherence would be impacted if, for example, virtual characters were introduced
to the environment.
A third experiment was designed to address the concern from the previous experiment
that the levels of immersion and of coherence were not sufficiently distinct from one another.
The overall goal of the experiment was the same, to see if immersion and coherence produce
different responses when participants are exposed to a visual cliff. Here, the two factors were
again immersion and coherence, but the way they were manipulated was different. The high
and low immersion levels were generated by manipulating field of view, passive haptics, and
sound cues (either all at a high level, or all at a low level). The high and low coherence levels
were generated by manipulating physical behavior of objects, validity of instructions, and the
presence of scenario-inappropriate sound (again, either all high, or all low).
Once again, this experiment failed to identify any traditional measures of presence that
could distinguish between PI effects and Psi effects. However, presence questionnaires did
indicate that high levels of immersion and coherence together result in higher presence, com-
pared to any of the other conditions. This suggests that “breaks in PI” and “breaks in Psi”
belong to a broader category of “breaks in experience,” any of which result in a degraded
user experience. In addition, participants’ heart rates, responded markedly differently in the
two Psi conditions; no such difference was observed across the PI conditions. This indicates
that a VE that exhibits unusual or confusing behavior (as in the case of the low coherence
level in this experiment) can cause stress in a user that affects physiological responses.
A final experiment (Factors of Coherence and Psi) involved 20 participants who experi-
enced a virtual bar scenario at a variety of levels of coherence. In this experiment, participants
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chose the number and order of coherence improvements in order to match the level of Psi
they felt when experiencing the bar with all coherence factors at the maximum level, making
as few improvements as possible to do so. There were two improvements available for each
of four factors: the coherence of virtual human behavior, the coherence of behavior of one’s
own virtual body, coherence of physical interactions (the physical behavior of a football in
the environment), and scenario coherence (the match between the rendered environment and
the described scenario).
Participants overwhelmingly chose improvements to their own virtual body first, followed
by the scenario, with the other two factors (virtual human coherence and coherence of physical
interactions) being improved last, on the whole. Responses to the ball varied substantially
among participants, with participants who interacted with the ball more (predominantly
males) reporting higher presence and upgrading the ball sooner.
1.7 Overview of the Thesis
Chapter 2 introduces background research relating to presence, focusing on definitions,
measurements, and previous experimental results. Chapter 3 presents several theoretical
arguments that further develop the theory of PI and Psi. Chapter 4 presents the design and
analysis of a study evaluating Psi in the context of training medical students using virtual
humans. Chapter 5 presents the design and analysis of an initial study investigating PI and
Psi in the Pit, a visual cliff virtual environment, as well as it’s follow-up study. Chapter 6
presents the design and results of a study exploring the relative importances of factors of
Psi. Finally, Chapter 7 contains a discussion of overall results and thoughts on future work
needed to further develop the theory and application of PI and Psi in the field of virtual
environments.
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CHAPTER 2
Presence and related concepts
In Chapter 1, I introduced the presence construct, along with comments regarding the
ways in which it is defined and measured. In this chapter, I explicate many of these definitions
and methods of measurement, identify some of the core themes and key differences in how
presence is discussed, and introduce related concepts including transportation, agency, and
reality judgment. I present the work on presence as three sections: definitions of presence,
measurement of presence, and models of presence—that is, works that propose a list of factors
that contribute to presence. I present my analysis at the end of each section.
The concepts presented here are the foundation of the work presented in this dissertation.
While Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion were introduced to the literature only in 2009,
they build on twenty years of prior work endeavoring to better define and measure the presence
construct.
2.1 Defining Presence
There have been many definitions of presence proposed in the literature. I propose that
these can be grouped into three categories: being there, non-mediation, and real objects.
Those definitions I classify as being there consider presence to be the feeling of being in
an environment, while those I classify as non-mediation consider presence to be a lack of
attention to the mediating technology. I further propose that the being there definitions
can be subdivided into two subcategories, active (in which the ability to act is specifically
considered as part of the definition) and passive (in which user actions are not specifically
addressed). I also propose that non-mediation definitions consist of two subcategories, internal
(in which the focus is on one’s thoughts, as in “suspension of disbelief” and external (in which
the focus is on the technology, as in the “illusion of non-mediation”). The classification of
definitions into these categories and subcategories can be seen in Table 2.1.
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In the remainder of this section, I present these definitions grouped by category, and
arranged in chronological order within each category. My comments follow at the end of this
section.
2.1.1 Definitions
The notion of presence as it is used in the context of virtual reality can be traced to
psychologist James Gibson, who defined presence as “the experience of one’s physical envi-
ronment . . . not [one’s] surroundings as they exist in the physical world, but [the] perception
of those surroundings as mediated by both automatic and controlled mental processes” (Gib-
son, 1979). In this Gibsonian context presence is explicitly in the context of the real world,
but already the idea is in place that presence can’t be determined simply by considering the
ground truth of the real environment, it is a subjective feeling generated by our perception
of the real world as mediated by our sense organs and the mental processes governing and
integrating them.
2.1.1.1 Being there
Steuer introduced Gibson’s notion of presence to the field of computer-mediated environ-
ments, defining the term telepresence as “the experience of presence (in the sense of Gibson) in
an environment by means of a communication medium” (Steuer, 1992). Steuer’s definition is
the start of some significant confusion, as many researchers have been concerned primarily—or
only—with the sense of presence in computer-mediated or virtual environments, but common
practice has been to refer to the sensation simply as presence, rather than “telepresence” or
“virtual presence.”
Schloerb introduced a different, “objective” definition of presence (Schloerb, 1995). Sub-
jective presence occurs when one perceives oneself as physically present in an environment.
However, one is only objectively present if one can successfully complete a specified task in the
environment. Here, then, we have an explicit, and in fact definitional, link between presence
and task performance: If one can successfully complete more tasks more often, one is more
present.
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Flach and Holden returned to Gibson’s research as the basis of presence, but not just
in terms of his definition of presence (Flach and Holden, 1998). To Gibson, “the reality
of experience is grounded in action”—we see the world in terms of affordances; that is, in
how can we interact with the world around us. The important characteristics of the world,
then (and in particular, the characteristics of the world that are important for experiencing
presence) are behavioral, rather than aesthetic.
Continuing that line of thinking, Zahorik and Jenison described presence as “tantamount
to successfully supported action in the environment” (Zahorik and Jenison, 1998). To them,
presence is determined by the extent that the perception/action coupling in the virtual world
matches our learned perception/action coupling in the real world.
Mantovani and Riva presented a view of the Gibsonian actor in (Mantovani and Riva,
2001). For such an ecologically situated actor there is not a clear separation of the subjective
internal model of the world and the objective ground truth of the outer world. Rather, the
actor is constantly in a process of adaptation to the estimated (that is, mediated) world in
which they exist. In this picture, one’s willingness to “react as if real” to the observed stimuli
and the world’s ability to “react as if real” to my sensorimotor actions are in fact inseparable.
In the paper which presented their landmark Presence Questionnaire, Witmer and Singer
defined presence as, “the subjective experience of being in one place or environment, even
when one is physically situated in another” (Witmer and Singer, 1998).
In 2001, Biocca defined presence as “the phenomenal state by which an individual feels
located and active in an environment, and, especially in the case of telepresence, the class of
experience where the environment is mediated by a technology” (Biocca, 2001). So here, the
user must not only be “located” (the traditional sense of ”being there”), but must also be
“active.” This is in keeping with the Gibsonian tradition, as in Zahorik and Jenison (Zahorik
and Jenison, 1998) or Flach and Holden (Flach and Holden, 1998). Note also that these
authors generally treat telepresence as a special case of presence, and that presence can be
(and normally is) felt in the real world.
In 2003, Slater revisited presence terminology, describing presence as a “response” to “an
appropriate conjunction of the human perceptual and motor system and immersion” (Slater,
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2004b). This is quite similar (albeit using very different terminology) to Zahorik and Jenison’s
conception of presence as being-in-the-world (Zahorik and Jenison, 1998). Here, if we assume
an actor (with a functioning perceptuomotor system) ecologically situated in the world (the
precise nature of the world and this situation being defined as immersion), then presence arises
to the extent that a valid perception/action coupling is supported by the virtual environment
(VE) system. Also, note the novel conception of presence as a “response.” Presence, in this
conception, can occur involuntarily: if the correct set of stimuli are provided (in terms of the
immersion of the system and the perceptuomotor characteristics of the individual user), then
presence will result. This seems to represent an evolution in thinking from Slater’s earlier
definition of presence involving suspension of disbelief.
Immersion
An aside about immersion: Immersion is the source of some confusion in its own right.
Slater has consistently regarded immersion as an objective characteristic of a VE system
(Slater, 1999). This is in contrast to Witmer and Singer, who define immersion as, “a
psychological state characterized by perceiving oneself to be enveloped by, included in, and
interacting with an environment that provides a continuous stream of stimuli and experiences”
(Witmer and Singer, 1998). Lombard and colleagues refer to these different conceptions of
immersion as perceptual immersion (Biocca and Delaney, 1995) and psychological immersion,
respectively (Lombard et al., 2000). These are clearly related concepts—Slater’s immersion
is what makes it possible to experience Witmer and Singers immersion—but using them
interchangeably has led to a lack of clarity in the VR literature. In this dissertation, unless
specifically stated otherwise, immersion is used to mean Slater’s conception of immersion as
an objective characteristic of a VE system.
Sas and O’Hare offered a slightly different conception of presence: one is present in another
world (mediated or imaginary) if (1) one’s cognitive processes are oriented toward that world
to the extent that one experiences “being there”, and (2) one’s focus of consciousness is on
the proximal (body-oriented, perhaps) stimuli in the mediated or imaginary world (Sas and
O’Hare, 2003). Here, as in Biocca (Biocca, 2001), we see a definition of presence as “being
there plus”, in this case, the “plus” being the fact that one is responding to stimuli from the
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virtual world, rather than the real one. It would seem to me that this definition assumes that
one can, at any given moment, only be present in one or the other environment; that your
consciousness can have two foci seems unlikely.
Spagnolli and Gamberini, on the other hand, maintained the focus of presence on location
(Spagnolli and Gamberini, 2004): “Whenever a person is qualified as ‘present’ . . . her location
is the salient, characterizing feature.” So an interaction with a virtual human in the real world
might elicit a whole host of feelings, but it would not elicit a sense of presence.
Wirth and colleagues define spatial presence as “the subjective experience of being in
the mediated environment” (Wirth et al., 2004). Here again we have presence limited to
mediated environments. For the authors it has two components: the sensation of being
physically situated in the environment (self-location) and the perception of possibilities to
act in that environment (possible actions). This is another example of “being there plus”, as
well as another definition of presence that is largely in keeping with the traditional Gibsonian
definition.
Carassa and her colleagues propose a definition of presence inspired by situated cognition
theory, in which “presence depends on the proper integration of aspects relevant to an agent’s
movement and perception, to her actions, and to her conception of the overall situation
in which she finds herself, as well as on how these aspects mesh with the possibilities for
action afforded in the interaction with the virtual environment” (Carassa et al., 2005). In my
interpretation, this correctly integrates a user’s learned expectations for correct behavior into
the Gibsonian model of presence in virtual environments.
Wilmer and Singer clarify their definition of presence in (Witmer et al., 2005). Presence
is defined as a psychological state of “being there” mediated by an environment that engages
our senses, captures our attention, and fosters our active involvement.” They also define
involvement as “a psychological state experienced as a consequence of focusing one’s mental
energy and attention on a coherent set of stimuli or meaningfully related activities or events.”
Riva and colleagues defined presence as “the non-mediated (prereflexive) perception of
successfully transforming intentions in action (enaction) within an external world” (Riva et al.,
2006). This builds on Zahorik and Jenison’s conception of presence as successfully supported
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action in the environment (Zahorik and Jenison, 1998). Here, we have no distinction between
real, virtual, or imaginary worlds; you can feel present in any or all of them if you are able
to transform your intentions into action. Also, it is a prereflexive, or intuitive, perception: it
is again something that “just happens” if the system is sufficiently in tune with your needs
(or vice versa), similar to Slater’s conception of presence as a response.
Herrera et al. define presence as the “conscious awareness of self, as both agent and
experiencer, which characterizes the experiencing self of natural environments” (Herrera et al.,
2006). Here again, this could apply to real, virtual, and mediated environments (although,
the authors state, not imaginary ones—the environments they refer to are “experienc[ed]”,
not imagined). This conception of self as both “agent and experiencer” again echoes Gibson,
in whose view one is always both acting on and being acted upon by the environment.
Wirth and colleagues refine their definition of spatial presence as, “a binary experience,
during which perceived self-location and, in most cases, perceived action possibilities are con-
nected to a mediated spatial environment, and mental capacities are bound by the mediated
environment instead of reality” in (Wirth et al., 2007).
2.1.1.2 Non-mediation
Slater and Usoh introduced the notion that presence in a mediated environment is “(sus-
pension of dis-)belief that [one] is in a world other than where [one’s] body is located” (Slater
and Usoh, 1993). Slater and Usoh’s definition introduces several new ideas: one, that we first
believe that we are not in the mediated environment, and two, that by some process, we can
overcome that belief. This idea of presence involving “suspension of disbelief” is a recurring
concept in the presence literature.
Lombard and Ditton proposed that presence is “the perceptual illusion of nonmediation”
(Lombard and Ditton, 1997). Note that this definition is explicitly for tele- or virtual presence,
not presence in a real environment; it assumes the existence of a communication medium that
can seem to disappear. One could make the argument, as in Gibson, that our experience of
the world is always mediated—that our perception of the world is not the same as the world
itself—and so presence in the real world is only a special case of such mediated presence
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experiences. Lombard and Ditton do not make this argument.
Lombard and Ditton also explicitly defined presence as binary. “It does not occur in
degrees but either does or does not occur at any instance during media use.” This is closely
associated to the conceptualization of presence as an illusion: either the illusion is in place,
or it is broken. Slater’s later conceptions of Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion are very
much in keeping with this school of thought (Slater, 2009).
Presence was officially defined by the International Society for Presence Research as fol-
lows:
“Presence (a shortened version of the term “telepresence”) is a psychological state
or subjective perception in which even though part or all of an individual’s cur-
rent experience is generated by and/or filtered through human-made technology,
part or all of the individual’s perception fails to accurately acknowledge the role
of the technology in the experience. Except in the most extreme cases, the in-
dividual can indicate correctly that s/he is using the technology, but at *some
level* and to *some degree*, her/his perceptions overlook that knowledge and
objects, events, entities, and environments are perceived as if the technology was
not involved in the experience. Experience is defined as a person’s observation of
and/or interaction with objects, entities, and/or events in her/his environment;
perception, the result of perceiving, is defined as a meaningful interpretation of
experience”(International Society for Presence Research, 2000).
This definition is clearly indebted to Lombard and Ditton, as the focus is on the illusion
of nonmediation rather than the experience of a place. However, it would seem that the
ISPR authors reject Lombard and Ditton’s belief that presence is binary, with the language
of “part or all” of an individual overlooking the mediating technology to “some level and
to some degree.” Note also that the authors are explicit about the fact that they are using
presence to mean telepresence, indicating clearly that this definition is only applicable to
technology-mediated interactions.
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2.1.1.3 Other - Objects are experienced as real
Kwan Min Lee defined presence as “a psychological state in which virtual (para-authentic
or artificial) objects are experienced as actual objects in either sensory or nonsensory ways”
(Lee, 2004). This is a new definition, that clearly puts the focus on things in the virtual world.
If one experiences these things as actual objects, they are present; if one doesn’t, they aren’t.
The “sensory or nonsensory” language is included specifically to account for situations where
feelings of presence are elicited by non-immersive media such as text (known as the “book
problem”). So “being there” is no longer the primary quality of the experience, making this
definition more amenable to usages in applications where one, for example, interacts with a
virtual human rather than experiencing a new place.
2.1.2 Analysis
So what, in the end, do we mean when we say presence? It seems to me that the shortest
and most commonly used definition, “the feeling of ‘being there’,” actually comes quite close
to the heart of the matter. Defining presence as a feeling has some theoretical grounding, as
well; Schubert conceptualizes presence as a “cognitive feeling,” with all that entails (Schubert,
2009).
I do not agree with some aspects of presence that appear in the definitions in the previous
section. Firstly, I disagree with definitions that include an element of the illusion of nonmedi-
ation. Spagnolli and Gamberini showed that users were capable of acting simultaneously in
the virtual/mediated environment and the real environment (Spagnolli and Gamberini, 2002).
It seems clear in this case that the user is aware, at least on some level, that it is a mediated
experience, since they are able to speak and act in ways that demonstrate their awareness of
the mediation. Similarly, I feel that the very existence of the book problem (Biocca, 2002)
is reason to doubt this conception of presence. I am not aware of any study that attempted
to demonstrate that readers are present only in the environment presented in the book, but
I suspect, on face, that while a user reading a book may report feeling presence, they are
always aware of the fact that they are reading a book.
I also feel that the conception of presence as a binary (on/off) construct is not necessarily
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true. The Spagnolli and Gamberini study cited above provides some evidence to the contrary,
and Schubert also argues against this requirement. It may be true that users will report feeling
present primarily in one space at any given time, but even so, there is no reason to believe
that the strength of this feeling must be constant. It may be that “feeling of presence” can be
conceived of as a continuous function that, as it rises and falls, may rise above or fall below
a binary threshold.
Definition of presence in this dissertation
In this thesis, then, I define presence as the cognitive feeling of being in a place. This
feeling can change based on the sensory representation of the place (particularly in the case of
a mediated environment, where this is dictated by the immersion of the mediating technology),
the affordances available to the user, the scenario in which the user finds himself, and the
user’s personal history, state and traits. Or, in short, the user who is present is located and
active in the space, whether real or mediated.
I claim that presence arises from the immersion of the system (the sensorimotor and
effective valid actions it supports), the coherence of the scenario, and the individual charac-
teristics of the user. That is, it arises naturally in a user who experiences Place Illusion and
Plausibility Illusion.
2.2 Measuring presence
Welch and colleagues identify self-report, behavioral, and physiological measures as po-
tential means of measuring presence (Welch et al., 1996). I follow that categorization here in
discussing the variety of presence measures that appear in the literature.
2.2.1 Self-report
Self-report refers to all techniques in which users report their subjective feelings of pres-
ence to the experimenter. An important subset of self-report measures are post-experience
questionnaires, which are discussed separately below.
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2.2.1.1 Questionnaires
This section briefly describes several existing questionnaires designed to measure pres-
ence (typically referred to as presence questionnaires), and concludes with discussion of their
history of use.
The first commonly used questionnaire to appear in the literature was the Slater-Usoh-
Steed (SUS) questionnaire, which first appeared in some form in (Slater et al., 1993) (later
republished as (Slater et al., 1995)). In the 1993 version of the SUS questionnaire there were
only three questions. The more common form of the questionnaire has six questions, and can
be seen in, for example, (Usoh et al., 2000).
Kim and Biocca introduced a questionnaire based around the constructs of arrival and
departure (Kim and Biocca, 1997). Arrival is the feeling of being there in a mediated envi-
ronment, departure is the feeling of not being in the real environment.
Witmer and Singer introduced their Presence Questionnaire (PQ), as well as their Immer-
sive Tendencies Questionnaire (ITQ), in (Witmer and Singer, 1998). The PQ is based on the
authors’ conception of presence as having four major categories of factors: control, sensory,
distraction, and realism. Each of the thirty-two questions is designed to address some aspect
of one of these four factors.
Lombard et al. discuss their efforts to develop an instrument for presence based on their
theoretical model of its components in (Lombard et al., 2000). In the paper, they identify six
“dimensions” of presence they found in the literature: presence as social richness, presence
as realism (both social and perceptual), presence as transportation, presence as immersion,
presence as a social actor within a medium, and presence where the medium is a social actor.
The authors claim that the common element among these types of presence is a perceptual
illusion of nonmediation. To measure these different conceptions of presence, the authors
present a 103-item questionnaire.
Baos and her colleagues argue that presence and reality judgment (the belief that our
experiences are real, or, they say, willing suspension of disbelief) are separate constructs
and should be treated as such (Ban˜os et al., 2000). They present an initial seventy-seven-
item questionnaire, the Reality Judgment and Presence Questionnaire (RJPQ), intended to
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measure both constructs. They chose questions to address nine factors of experience: real-
ity judgment, presence, emotional involvement, interaction, control, attention/flow, realism,
congruence/continuity, and expectations.
Lessiter and colleagues introduce the ITC Sense of Presence Inventory (ITC-SOPI) in
(Lessiter et al., 2001).The intent of this 44-item questionnaire is to focus entirely on the users
experience with the media, and so there are no questions that address specific properties of
either the system (e.g., input devices), or the content (e.g., story elements). It is intended to
be usable with a variety of media types, including non-immersive and non-interactive media,
such as television programs or movies.
Schubert, Friedmann, and Regenbrecht introduce the igroup Presence Questionnaire (IPQ)
in (Schubert et al., 2001). The authors follow Zahorik and Jenison in connecting presence to
supported action in the VE (Zahorik and Jenison, 1998). This thirteen-item questionnaire
is intended for use in all forms of virtual environments, including immersive VR systems,
desktop VR, 3D games, and text-based VEs such as MUDs (multi-user dungeons).
Vorderer et al. present the MEC Spatial Presence Questionnaire (MEC-SPQ) in (Vorderer
et al., 2004). This questionnaire assumes that spatial presence is built of nine constructs: four
process factors (attention allocation, spatial situation model, spatial presence—self location,
spatial presence—possible actions), two psychological state factors (higher cognitive involve-
ment, suspension of disbelief), and three psychological trait factors (domain-specific interest,
visual/spatial imagery, and absorption). They offer short, medium, and long versions of the
MEC-SPQ, comprised of 4, 6, or 8 questions, respectively, for each construct (thirty-six,
fifty-four, or seventy two questions in total).
Sas and O’Hare developed a novel 34-item questionnaire for their experiment in (Sas
and O’Hare, 2003). They validated this questionnaire by demonstrating that it was highly
significantly correlated with the SUS questionnaire.
Chertoff and colleagues present a survey developed to measure “holistic virtual environ-
ment experiences” in (Chertoff et al., 2010). By holistic, the authors seem to mean that the
environment incorporates aspects of experiential design; specifically that it includes affective
(emotion) and cognitive (engagement) aspects. The survey includes 17 questions address-
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ing five dimensions of experiential design: affective, cognitive, sensory (immersion), active
(“personal connection . . . to an experience”), and relational (social).
Published use of questionnaires
Rosakranse and Oh identify five canonical presence questionnaires—the Slater-Usoh-Steed
(SUS) questionnaire, the Witmer-Singer Presence Questionnaire (PQ), the igroup Presence
Questionnaire (IPQ), the ITC-Sense of Presence Inventory (ITC-SOPI), and the Lombard and
Ditton questionnaire—and track their histories of use in three academic publishing outlets—
Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, the ISPR conference proceedings, and
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking (Rosakranse and Oh, 2014). It is notable
that these three outlets represent different research communities. Presence tends to focus on
research in immersive virtual environments, while the ISPR conference primarily focuses on
media scholarship, and Cyberpsychology is an outlet for psychology researchers.
Rosakranse and Oh found that in Presence, the PQ and SUS questionnaires have remained
dominant, while in ISPR, the ITC-SOPI questionnaire is now most commonly used, and in
Cyberpsychology, SUS, PQ, IPQ and ITC-SOPI are all used approximately equally often.
Note that all of these questionnaires came into use before 2002 and are still in use in 2014
(when the paper was published). In particular, the authors do not consider the usage of the
MEC-SPQ.
2.2.1.2 Other self-report measures
Welch et al. reported the results of two studies where participants experienced a simulated
driving scene (Welch et al., 1996). In these studies, presence was measured by means of paired
comparisons—after every pair of exposures, the participant marked on a scale of 1 to 100 how
different their senses of presence were between the most recent exposure and the previous
one.
Snow and Williges use the technique of free-modulus magnitude estimation to measure
presence in VEs (Snow and Williges, 1998). In free-modulus magnitude estimation, a partic-
ipant is presented with a series of stimuli and asked to assign a numeric value representing
their level of the desired quantity—in this case, presence—to each stimulus. There is no
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predetermined scale. The participant is instructed to assign any positive number to the first
stimulus, and then score all successive stimuli relative to that first number.
Freeman et al. present a novel form of direct subjective presence evaluation and the results
of three experimental studies using it (Freeman et al., 1999). They gave users a handheld
slider that was continuously sampled during each trial. They instructed users to move the
slider depending on how present they felt. However, rather than analyze these slider values
as a continuous measure of presence, the mean of the slider value was computed for each trial
for each participant, and these means were the values used in their analyses.
Techniques based on measuring breaks in presence, as introduced by Slater and Steed,
are important variations on the self-report theme. Here, rather than reporting their level
of felt presence, users report the moments when they do not feel present, and this series of
events can be analyzed to generate a measure of presence. In the original paper (Slater and
Steed, 2000), the breaks in presence were used to generate a Markov chain that continuously
modeled the probability that a user felt present at any given time. Subsequent research also
evaluated using raw counts of breaks in presence, rather than the more complex Markov
chain analysis, and demonstrated that the overall count of breaks in presence is significantly
negatively correlated with presence as measured by questionnaire (Brogni et al., 2003).
Breaks in presence have also been investigated in combination with physiological measures
(Slater et al., 2003) (Slater et al., 2006), as well as with other types of self-report measures.
Garau et al. induced breaks in presence in a virtual environment, then followed up with
semi-structured interviews, the transcripts of which were subjected to content analysis (in
which researchers define categories of interest before the experiment and then measure them
quantitatively by looking for key words or phrases in the transcript) and thematic analysis
(which looks for ideas that are not connected to the initial research questions). Participants
also were asked to draw graphs corresponding to their sense of “being there”, with time on
the X-axis and the environment (lab or bar) on the Y-axis (Garau et al., 2008).
Kuschel and colleagues propose a new measure of presence based on perception of conflict-
ing information across multiple sensory modalities (in their specific case, visual and haptic).
In this measure, the user is presented with two or more streams of conflicting sensory data
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in different modalities, and is present in whichever one they perceive as dominant (Kuschel
et al., 2007).
Riener and Proffitt propose a means of quantifying spatial presence by comparing the
results of visual illusions (specifically the vertical-horizontal illusion (Figure 2.1) and the
Ponzo illusion (Figure 2.2) in photographs, the real world, and in virtual environments. Here
the measure is the users’ estimated sizes of the lines in each illusion. They found that the size
misestimations in virtual environments were closer to those in the real world for the vertical-
horizontal illusion, while they were closer to photographs with strong perspective cues for the
Ponzo illusion (Riener and Proffitt, 2002).
Figure 2.1: Vertical horizontal illusion: Even though line segments AB and BC are the
same length, participants estimate BC to be longer than AB. (3-6% longer in photographs,
20-40% longer in the real world.)
2.2.2 Physiological metrics
Dillon et al. put forward a plan to compare skin conductance response (SCR) (also referred
to as galvanic skin response, GSR, or electrodermal activity, EDA) and electrocardiogram
(EKG) data with presence as measured by the ITC-SOPI (Lessiter et al., 2001) in a study
where participants view a video stream presented either stereoscopically or monoscopically
in (Dillon et al., 2000). The results of that study are summarized in (Dillon et al., 2002),
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Figure 2.2: Ponzo illusion: Even though line segments A and B are the same length,
participants estimate A to be longer than B.
and the results of another study investigating the effects of emotional media content and
display size on presence and arousal are also presented there. The authors did not find a
correlation between physiological metrics and presence. Note that the stimuli in these studies
were neither immersive nor inherently arousing.
Meehan explored the same measures as well as skin temperature in an immersive virtual
environment that did contain an inherently stressful stimulus, a visual cliff scenario (Meehan
et al., 2002). There, Meehan and colleagues did find that a larger increase in heart rate when
exposed to the visual cliff significantly correlated with an increase in presence as measured
by the SUS questionnaire, indicating that physiological measures such as change in heart rate
may be able to serve as an objective proxy measure for presence in such scenarios. (That is,
between virtual environments that contain a known arousal-inducing stimulus, such as the
visual cliff, and those that do not.)
As mentioned in the previous section, when talking about breaks in presence, Slater and
colleagues have used physiological metrics to measure users’ responses to breaks in presence
in virtual environments, both experimenter-caused (Slater et al., 2006) and incidental (Slater
et al., 2003).
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2.2.3 Behavioral metrics
Sheridan proposed that in addition to self-report methods, presence could be measured by
behavioral methods such as response to threatening stimuli (for example, flinching out of the
way of a virtual ball) or to socially-conditioned behaviors (for example, saying, “Gesundheit,”
in response to a sneeze in the VE) (Sheridan, 1992).
Regenbrecht, Schubert, and Friedmann demonstrated that fear increased with higher pres-
ence in a virtual environment designed to elicit fear of heights (Regenbrecht et al., 1998).
Presence was measured using Likert-style responses to 14 questions that included questions
from (Slater et al., 1994) and (Hendrix and Barfield, 1995); anxiety was measured using the
State-Trait Anxiety Index, a 20-item questionnaire (Laux et al., 1981). I classify this with
the behavioral metrics rather than the self-report metrics because the self-reported quantity
is not presence, as it is in all the other measures classified as self-report.
Freeman et al. proposed the use of behavioral metrics for presence; specifically the mag-
nitude of postural response for seated participants viewing a video (Freeman et al., 2000).
The authors conducted a 24 participant study to evaluate this metric. Participants viewed
two video clips: one was excerpted from a video recorded from the hood of a rally car, and
the other was a still frame from a video taken at the side of the rally track. The soundtrack
was the same in both videos, giving the impression of a car off in the distance in the still
video case. All participants saw both stimuli in both monoscopic and stereoscopic presenta-
tions. Participants rated their presence (as well as involvement, self-motion, and sickness) on
a scale from 0 to 100 on a visual analogue scale after each trial, and their postural responses
were tracked. Participants’ self-rated presence scores showed significantly higher presence
for stereoscopic presentation and for the moving video stimulus, with no interaction between
the factors. There was no significant relationship between presence and postural response,
however.
2.2.4 Analysis
The proliferation of questionnaires adds complexity to presence research. In my previous
experience (see Chapter 5), I’ve used several presence questionnaires, and found their results
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to be extremely highly correlated. I believe that it is only necessary to use one questionnaire,
although which to use may change based on the specifics of the experiment. For example, if
one is particularly interested in reality judgment, or one or more of the subscores of the MEC
questionnaire, one should certainly use the RJPQ or MEC-SPQ, respectively. For a general
presence measure, I would recommend the SUS questionnaire, as it is both the shortest (saving
both experimenter and participant time) and the questionnaire that most directly measures
the feeling of presence.
I believe that behavioral metrics are a promising area of study that has so far been
understudied. Physiological metrics may ultimately be limited in their utility as they have
been shown to be useful only in experiments that are known to affect physiological signals
in particular ways (e.g., increasing arousal in a stressful environment), but it is likely that
appropriate behavioral signals could be found in nearly any virtual scenario.
2.3 Models of presence
In this section, I have grouped together those papers that posit a list of components
asserted to contribute to presence. Some of these groupings are purely theoretical, and some
were either the basis of questionnaires or factors derived from questionnaires in use. Therefore,
some papers from the questionnaire section are repeated here. As well as presenting these
theorized components of the presence construct here together, I also intend to demonstrate
how these components can be usefully grouped. These models are presented in chronological
order, as in Table 2.2. Note that there is no implied relationship among the data columns
in Table 2.2; the components for each publication are listed across each row in no particular
order. Figure2.3 contains an illustration of these same components, grouped by higher-order
concept. Note also that Slater’s Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion are not included in
Table 2.2, but they do appear as higher-order concepts in 2.3.
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2.3.1 Models
Akin and colleagues define telepresence as the condition that occurs when, “At the work-
site, the manipulators have the dexterity to allow the operator to perform normal human
functions. At the control station, the operator receives sufficient quantity and quality of
sensory feedback to provide a feeling of actual presence at the worksite” (Akin et al., 1983).
In other words, I would argue that the authors identify two factors of telepresence: ability
to act in the remote environment and sensory fidelity delivered to the user. Note that this
definition is specifically referring to telepresence and not presence or virtual presence, hence
the references to worksite and control station.
Heeter proposes three dimensions of presence: subjective personal presence (feeling that
you are in the virtual environment), social presence (feeling that other beings exist in the world
and react to you), and environmental presence (feeling that the environment acknowledges
and reacts to you) (Heeter, 1992).
Sheridan proposes three factors of presence: extent of sensory information, control of
the relation of sensors to the environment, and ability to modify the physical environment
(Sheridan, 1992). He also argues that presence is likely task-dependent, and that “fixed”
characteristics of the system (immersion factors and task properties) should affect dependent
measures of user experience, such as presence, training efficiency, task performance, and so
on.
Held and Durlach speculate on the value of telepresence, as well as its potential causal
factors in (Held and Durlach, 1992). They argue that telepresence is most desirable in appli-
cations where the tasks are wide-ranging, complex, and uncertain, “because the best general
purpose system known to us . . . is us.” They go on to speculate on the factors that contribute
to telepresence, identifying sensory factors—resolution, field of view, consistency of informa-
tion across modalities, and displays that are “free from production of artificial stimuli that
signal the existence of the display”, motor factors—support for movements of sensory organs
and of viewed effectors, high correlation between kinesthetic feedback and sensed actions from
the remote environment, identification with the robot (visual similarity), familiarity with the
system, and “the cognitive representation of the operator’s interaction with the world” as
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factors that are likely to contribute to greater telepresence.
Arrival and departure were identified as the two factors in the presence questionnaire
created by Kim and Biocca (Kim and Biocca, 1997). Arrival is the feeling of being there in
a mediated environment, departure is the feeling of not being in the real environment, and
presence arises from the combination of the two.
Draper and his colleagues review existing conceptions of telepresence, and put forward an
attentional resource model for telepresence in (Draper et al., 1998). This model argues that
telepresence increases as a function of the sum of attentional resources devoted to processing
task-related stimuli from the mediated environment and the attentional resources devoted to
overcoming distractors.
Witmer and Singer proposed four major categories of factors that affect presence in the
development of their presence questionnaire: Control, Sensory, Distraction, and Realism (Wit-
mer and Singer, 1998). They also claim that factors may influence presence by acting on psy-
chological immersion, involvement, or both. For example, they theorize that control factors
impact psychological immersion but not involvement, while realism factors impact involve-
ment but not psychological immersion. Distraction and sensory factors are theorized to affect
both. Control factors include predictability, interactivity of the environment, and input con-
trols; sensory factors include richness of the environment, number and fidelity of sensory
modalities, and consistency of multimodal stimuli; distraction factors include isolation from
the physical environment and interface awareness; and realism factors concern the degree to
which the experience is meaningful and coherent with expectations from the real world. Each
question on the PQ is intended to address some aspect of one of these factors. The results of
a cluster analysis of four studies using the Witmer and Singer PQ identified three subscales
in the PQ data—Involvement/Control, Naturalness, and Interface Quality.
Bystrom et al. propose the immersion, presence, performance (IPP) model for interaction
in virtual environments. The authors adopt Slater’s definition of immersion, and presence is
used in the common sense of “being there”. The IPP model, in brief, claims that sensory
fidelity (resulting from a sufficiently immersive system) causes a user to allocate attentional
resources to the VE, and that this allocation of attentional resources enables the user to
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experience presence in the VE and perform the given task. Furthermore, it claims that there
is a feedback loop: more attention causes more presence and more task engagement, and
increased task engagement causes the user to allocate more attentional resources (Bystrom
et al., 1999).
Bystrom et al. state that this model is based on the two models of presence proposed
by Slater and colleagues (Slater et al., 1996) (Slater and Wilbur, 1997) and by Barfield and
colleagues (Hendrix and Barfield, 1996b) (Hendrix and Barfield, 1996a). The Slater model
as outlined here describes presence as, “determined not only by . . . aspects of displays . . . but
also mediated by the sorts of sensory information required to perform the task at hand . . . and
individual differences in preferences for information”. The Barfield model describes presence
as “dependent on the degree to which . . . transformations of objects in a virtual environment
are similar to . . . transformations of objects in the real world.”
Schubert et al. present the results of a factor analysis on an experiment in which 246
participants answered a 75-item survey of new questions and questions taken from Carlin et
al. (Carlin et al., 1997), Ellis et al. (Ellis et al., 1997), Slater et al., (Slater et al., 1994),
Towell and Towell (Towell and Towell, 1997), (Witmer and Singer, 1998), and Regenbrecht
et al. (Regenbrecht et al., 1998). The authors extracted eight factors that combined express
50.27% of the total variance. These factors, in decreasing order of importance, were spatial
presence, quality of immersion, involvement, drama, interface awareness, exploration of the
VE, predictability and interaction, and realness. The authors then performed a second order
factor analysis to see how the factors grouped together. In a two-factor solution, the first
factor grouped spatial presence, quality of immersion, involvement, drama, and realness, and
the second factor grouped interface awareness, exploration, and predictability and interaction.
In a three-factor solution, the first factor grouped spatial presence, involvement, and realness,
the second factor grouped interface awareness, predictability and interaction, and exploration,
and the third factor grouped drama and quality of immersion (Schubert and Regenbrecht,
1999) (Schubert et al., 2001).
IJsselsteijn et al. review the existing presence literature to summarize research into the
factors contributing to presence and the methods for measuring it. The authors identify four
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determinants of presence: (1) the extent and fidelity of sensory information, (2) the match
between sensors and display, (3) content factors (a broad category covering most anything
else that is part of the virtual scenario), and (4) user characteristics (IJsselsteijn et al., 2000).
Lombard et al. discuss their efforts to develop an instrument for presence based on
their theoretical model of its components. In the literature, they identified six “dimensions”
of presence: presence as social richness, presence as realism (both social and perceptual),
presence as transportation, presence as immersion, presence as a social actor within a medium,
and presence where the medium is a social actor. The authors claim that the common element
among these types of presence is a perceptual illusion of nonmediation (Lombard et al., 2000).
Sas and O’Hare presented a ”presence equation”, where 45% of presence variation can be
predicted as
0.37×Willingness to Suspend Disbelief+0.29×Creative Imagination/Absorption. (2.1)
They later presented a more general form of the presence equation,
Presence = a× (General cognitive factors) + b× (Task specific cognitivefactors)
+ c× (Technological factors) + d× (Media content). (2.2)
Note that “General cognitive factors” is the only term that is entirely dependent on the
participant, whereas c and d are entirely dependent on the specific VE, and b is at least
partially dependent on the specific VE. Furthermore, the authors’ own previous discussion
regarding immersive vs. non-immersive VEs seems to indicate that they believe c > a, b.
They argue for the use of a non-immersive VE for their experiment because then presence
differences will be due to human factors rather than immersion (Sas and O’Hare, 2003).
Witmer and colleagues revisit their presence questionnaire with a factor analysis in (Wit-
mer et al., 2005). They identified four factors of their presence questionnaire, which combined
account for 52.2% of the variance. These factors are Involvement (accounting for 31.9% of
variance), Sensory Fidelity, Adaptation/Immersion, and Interface Quality.
Wirth and colleagues present a theoretical model by which spatial presence might be
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generated in a participant. They propose a two-stage model. In the first stage, one constructs
a spatial situation model (SSM), i.e., a mental model of the spatial environment that one
constructs based on (1) spatial cues that one processes and (2) relevant personal spatial
memories and cognitions. In the second stage, one defines his or her primary egocentric
reference frame (PERF), which is either the SSM representing the mediated environment, in
which case one is present in the virtual environment, or the SSM representing the real world, in
which case one is not present in the VE. Specifically, the authors claim that spatial presence
occurs when the medium-as-PERF hypothesis is confirmed repeatedly through processed
information and is thus stabilized over time (Wirth et al., 2007). It seems to me that the
SSM formalizes Held and Durlach’s “cognitive representation of the operator’s interaction
with the world” (Held and Durlach, 1992).
For Wirth et al., then, an individual’s sense of presence in any mediated environment is
dependent on both characteristics of the environment—e.g., richness, salience, consistency—
and of the individual user—e.g., attention, involvement, suspension of disbelief.
2.3.2 Analysis
Unlike the definitions of presence in Section 2.1.1, the models of presence are strikingly
similar. Almost all can be transformed into one another, or into, for example, the more
recently developed PI/Psi framework. Akin et al.’s conception of telepresence being composed
of the ability to act in the remote environment plus the ability to display sense data in the local
environment is very similar to Slater’s conception of immersion being composed of effective
and sensorimotor valid actions (Akin et al., 1983). The authors do not consider coherence,
but they have no need to, since they are explicitly talking about remote real environments as
opposed to virtual ones. Heeter’s subjective personal presence is precisely Place Illusion, while
social presence and environmental presence are components of Plausibility Illusion (Heeter,
1992). Sheridan’s factors contributing to telepresence are, again, sensorimotor and effective
valid actions, plus the extent of sensor information, which is also an aspect of immersion
(Sheridan, 1992). Witmer and Singer’s conception of presence as arising from control factors,
sensory factors, distraction factors, and realism factors can be restated as immersion (control
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and sensory) plus coherence (distraction and realism) (Witmer and Singer, 1998).
IJsselsteijn et al., Sas and O’Hare, and Wirth et al. introduce individual differences to the
discussion (IJsselsteijn et al., 2000) (Sas and O’Hare, 2003) (Wirth et al., 2007). Specifically,
Sas and O’Hare’s presence equation
Presence = a× (General cognitive factors) + b× (Task specific cognitivefactors)
+ c× (Technological factors) + d× (Media content) (2.3)
consists of individual differences of state and trait, immersion, and coherence. It also consists
of the respective coefficients on each of these terms, which might be better restated as
Presence = A[V ector of cognitive factors]+B[V ector of task specific cognitive factors]
+ C[V ector of technological factors] + D[V ector of media content factors] (2.4)
to more accurately represent the difficulty involved in computing a “presence equation.”
In Figure 2.3, I have grouped the presence components discussed in this section (and
presented in Table 2.2). This grouping demonstrates that most of the components that have
previously been proposed as making up the presence construct can in fact be grouped as com-
ponents of PI, Psi, immersion, or coherence. Several others can be grouped under the heading
of attention or distraction, and another subset can be grouped under individual differences.
Taken together, these categories account for the overwhelming majority of components that
have been proposed as part of the presence construct.
While immersion and coherence (and therefore PI and Psi) are largely under the control
of the developer of the virtual environment, attention and individual differences are generally
not. Many of these models of presence, then, take into consideration the impact of individual
differences on presence, at least implicitly.
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Figure 2.3: Clustering of presence model components
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2.4 Factor Analyses
There have been three major factor analyses of presence and presence questionnaires in the
literature, performed by Schubert et al., Lessiter et al., and Witmer et al.(Schubert and Re-
genbrecht, 1999) (Schubert et al., 2001) (Lessiter et al., 2001) (Witmer et al., 2005). Schubert
et al. identified eight factors—spatial presence, quality of immersion, involvement, drama,
interface awareness, exploration of the VE, predictability and interaction, and realness—that
then grouped into three second-order factors—spatial presence, involvement, and realness.
Lessiter et al. identified four factors—sense of physical space, engagement, naturalness, and
negative effects. Witmer et al. identified four factors as well, which were involvement, sensory
fidelity, adaptation/immersion, and interface quality.
An inherent limitation of factor analyses is that they can only group based on the items
that were actually used in the measure. So if a questionnaire does not include questions about
the coherence of social interactions, for example, there cannot be a factor that addresses that
construct. On the other hand, if a questionnaire does ask questions about a construct that
others do not—as with the ITC-SOPI and negative effects—that construct is likely to be
represented by a factor. The initial selection of items, then, inherently biases the factor
analysis that follows.
That said, it is enlightening to look at the similarities and differences among these factor
lists. All three include a factor they call “involvement” or “engagement”. (I will use involve-
ment going forward.) However, a look at the questions that make up these factors reveals that
they may actually represent different constructs. For Lessiter et al., this factor is represented
by items such as, “I enjoyed myself”, and “My experience was intense”. These items seem to
represent an overall affinity for the experience, rather than specifically relating to presence.
For Witmer et al., the Involvement factor contains items including “How much were you able
to control events?”, “How much did the visual aspects of the environment involve you?”,
and “How much did your experiences in the virtual environment seem consistent with your
real world experiences?”, which don’t on face seem to represent any one construct. On the
other hand, for Schubert et al., Involvement is represented by items including “I concentrated
only on the virtual space”, and “I was completely captivated by the virtual world”, which
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seems clearly to represent an attentional component. This discussion demonstrates that these
factors are not as similar as one would assume from the names.
From Schubert et al., I classify the Spatial Presence factor as a sub-questionnaire asking
directly about the feeling of spatial presence (as the SUS questionnaire asks directly about the
feeling of presence), Involvement as an attentional component, Predictability and Interaction,
Realness, and Drama as coherence factors, and Quality of Immersion, Interface Awareness,
and Exploration as immersion factors.
From Lessiter et al. I classify the Sense of Physical Space factor as a sub-questionnaire
asking directly about the feeling of spatial presence, Engagement as an affinity component,
Naturalness as a coherence factor, and Negative Effects as a (reverse-coded) immersion factor.
From Witmer et al. I classify their Interface Quality and Sensory Fidelity factors as being
immersion factors, and Involvement and Adaptation/Immersion to be primarily coherence
factors.
2.5 Related Concepts
2.5.1 Transportation
Broadly speaking, the concept of transportation is to narrative worlds as the concept of
presence is to technology-mediated worlds (Gerrig, 1993). In a state of transportation, “[T]he
reader loses access to some real-world facts in favor of accepting the narrative world that the
author has created . . . transported readers may experience strong emotions and motivations,
even when they know the events in the story are not real” (Green and Brock, 2000).
Transportability refers to a person’s inherent ability to be transported by a narrative.
There is not an equivalent term in the field of presence research, although this idea was
explored in the form of Witmer and Singer’s Immersive Tendencies Questionnaire (Witmer
and Singer, 1998). There are transportation and transportability questionnaires that are
analogous to the PQ and ITQ, respectively (Green and Brock, 2000) (Green, 1996).
39
2.5.2 Agency
Agency (Russell, 1996) is “the sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an
action,” (Gallagher, 2000) or “the satisfying power to take meaningful action and see the
results of our decisions and choices” (Murray, 1997). Agency has been identified as a concept
that may share some features and factors with presence (Herrera et al., 2006). There is some
speculation that the brain mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency may be related
to those that give rise to presence (David et al., 2008) (Seth et al., 2012).
2.5.3 Reality Judgment
Baos and colleagues argue for the existence of reality judgment as a construct separate
from presence. They point out that one can attribute reality to something without feeling
a sense of presence, for example, when watching a news broadcast; or vice versa, as when
playing a fantasy video game. So reality judgment (the belief that our experiences are real)
should be treated as related to, but distinct from, presence (Ban˜os et al., 2000)(Ban˜os et al.,
2004).
2.5.4 Analysis
Too often, virtual reality researchers focus only on the research published in their specific
sub-field. Virtual reality researchers are computer scientists, media theorists, and both clinical
and experimental psychologists, to name only some of the more prominent disciplines. These
researchers then tend to publish in the conferences and journals that they are most familiar
with, which may not be frequently read by researchers in other disciplines.
Transportation, for example, is directly analogous to presence, and may become even
more relevant as research explores narrative and coherence factors of virtual environments
that have previously gone understudied. Agency, likewise, is a close cousin of presence,
particularly if one accepts that presence is inherently connected to one’s ability to act in
virtual environments. Reality judgment represents the most direct effort any researchers have
made to study the value of realism in virtual environments, at least prior to the introduction
of Plausibility Illusion.
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter reviewed the existing presence literature in order to provide background and
context for the development of theory regarding Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion. I
first reviewed many of the definitions of presence in the literature. As a synthesis of these
definitions, in this dissertation, I define presence as the cognitive feeling of being in a place.
Notably, this feeling does not arise only from immersion, but also from coherence and both
state and trait characteristics of the individual user. Secondly, I reviewed existing meth-
ods for measuring presence, categorizing them as self-report (predominantly, but not only,
post-experiment questionnaires), behavioral, and physiological. Thirdly, I reviewed models
of presence in the literature, arguing that most of these models are remarkably similar to the
Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion model, albeit using different terms. Finally, I reviewed
some related concepts, specifically identifying reality judgment as the closest cousin to Plau-
sibility Illusion existing in the literature. In the next chapter, I will define terms and develop
theory specifically relating to the concepts of Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion.
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CHAPTER 3
Fleshing out the Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion Concepts
As the concepts of Place Illusion (PI) and Plausibility Illusion (Psi) have not yet been
widely adopted by the community of VR researchers, there is a lack not only of experimental
research, but also a lack of theoretical development. This chapter extends and clarifies theory
of PI and Psi to guide and support experimental research described in Chapters 4, 5, and
6. I also identify some previous concepts and experimental results in VR research that are
explained or explicated by the PI/Psi framework.
3.1 Definitions
In Chapter 2, immersion was discussed as an objective characteristic of a VE system
(Slater, 1999). Here, to be more precise, I use Slater’s definition from (Slater, 2009); namely,
that the immersion of a VE system is given by the set of all valid actions supported by that
VE system. A valid action is any action a VE user can take that results in a change to the
state of the virtual environment (an effective valid action) or to her perception of the virtual
environment (a sensorimotor valid action) (Slater, 2009). For instance, if the visible view
rotates as a user rotates their head, that is a sensorimotor valid action; if a user can reach
out with their real hand and push an object in the virtual environment, that is an effective
valid action.
I define a virtual scenario (also scenario) to be specifically a virtual environment as well
as the behavior of that environment and any characters or objects in it.
As a parallel to Slater’s definition of immersion, I define the coherence of a virtual scenario
as the set of reasonable circumstances that can be demonstrated by the scenario without in-
troducing unreasonable circumstances. I define a reasonable circumstance as a state of affairs
in a virtual scenario that is self-evident given prior knowledge. Unreasonable circumstances
are the opposite, states of affairs that are inconsistent with prior knowledge. Note that an
unreasonable circumstance may become reasonable if the user is properly prepared. (See
Section 3.5 for more discussion of priming.) For example, Interrante’s Seven League Boots
would seem unreasonable if the user was unprepared, but would become reasonable if they
had been informed about the technique in advance (Interrante et al., 2007).
3.2 Immersion and Place Illusion
In (Slater, 2009), Slater states, “Immersion provides the boundaries within which PI can
occur.” By this Slater means not that there is a direct causal relationship in which more
immersion leads to more PI. Rather, the immersion of the VE system itself is only one part
of the illusion; other components include the specific virtual environment, the task being
performed in the environment, the specific actions taken by a user, and both long- and short-
term (that is, both trait and state) characteristics of the user.
The potential influence of each of these factors—the VE itself, the task, and user character-
istics—on PI can be illustrated with some examples. An environment with much high-
frequency visual detail (representing a library with open books, for example) would benefit
much more from an imaging and display system that had high optical resolution than an
environment with little high-frequency visual detail (such as the view out of a cockpit win-
dow). In the former case, the high optical resolution might well enable users to experience
more Place Illusion, or alternatively, might prevent their PI from being broken. In the latter
case, though, the higher optical resolution display would not be likely to have an effect on PI.
These statements may be true even though the immersion of both systems is the same.
Similarly, a free-form information gathering task would also likely benefit more from high
resolution visual display than would a timed navigation task, where the user may be moving
quickly and unable to tarry. On the other hand, a user who is not wearing his corrective
lenses, or a user who is colorblind, would have different sets of available valid actions than a
user with normal color vision. Thus, various characteristics of the environment and of the user
can effectively reduce the set of valid actions—and therefore, the immersion—of the system,
and this can affect the level of PI a user feels.
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Immersion, then, is an objective characteristic of a VE system, defined in terms of the
valid sensorimotor actions that the system can support. PI is a feeling, which arises to
the extent that a user’s attempted actions are supported by the system or, alternatively, is
broken to the extent that a user’s attempted actions are not supported by the system. And a
user’s attempted actions may be constrained by the environment, the task, or the individual
characteristics of the user.
3.3 Coherence and Plausibility Illusion
Immersion as a concept, and in particular Slater’s definition thereof, is well-established in
the VE research community. So to say that PI arises to the extent that a user successfully
probes the immersive characteristics of a system is sensible, and in fact studying the relation-
ships between many immersive characteristics of VE systems and the presence they induce
has been a frequent subject for VE research.
There does not, however, exist an equivalent concept for reasoning about the extent to
which a VE is well-behaved, which is what is needed for reasoning about Psi. Where PI emerges
when a user successfully probes the immersive characteristics of a system, Psi emerges when
a user successfully probes the behavioral characteristics of a scenario. There is a need for
a term that describes the degree to which the virtual scenario behaves in a reasonable and
predictable way. I introduce the term coherence for this concept.
The coherence characteristics of a system include, but are not limited to: the extent to
which the appearance and behavior of a user’s virtual body matches his real body, the extent
to which virtual humans are present in the scenario and act appropriately for the scenario,
the extent to which objects in the scenario can be interacted with and the degree to which
those interactions are correct or predictable, and the extent to which a scenario accurately
depicts what it purports to depict. Granted, these characteristics are not as objective on face
as the immersive characteristics of a system. Field of view can be measured and objectively
verified and given a number, whereas the same is not true of the realism of virtual human
behavior, for example. That said, it is necessary to attempt to operationalize coherence to
talk about Psi, in the same way that immersion is needed in order to reason about PI. It is
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not possible as yet to measure the actual feelings inside the heads of users, so instead it is
necessary to reason about the characteristics in the real (or virtual) world that give rise to
those feelings.
3.4 Orthogonality of PI and Psi
Slater has stated that PI and Psi are orthogonal components of virtual experience. It
is important to note that by orthogonal, he means “logically distinct”, not “statistically
independent” (Slater, 2004c). That said, can one experience one without the other?
3.4.1 Can a participant experience PI with no Psi?
From the definitions, this would mean that the user believes that he is in a place, but that
what is apparently happening in that place is not really happening. From further discussions
of PI and immersion, PI is made possible by immersion, which in turn comes from the valid
actions the VE supports.
So, a VE that would enable users to experience PI with no Psi would have to have a high
degree of immersion (for example, with real-walking locomotion and a head-tracked HMD),
but events in that scenario would seem to be “not really happening”. One could imagine
this in a “surrealist” world, or one that seems to be as in a dream. In short, characters and
objects in the environment would have to behave in unrealistic (and inconsistent, so as not to
allow the user to “train” themselves on the logic of the VE) fashion. This could be achieved,
I believe, by adding random components to behaviors in the VE. Consider an environment
in which the laws of physics work randomly, and characters interact (or do not) in randomly
selected languages, where some of the characters will approach you and start a conversation
while others do not respond to any stimulus whatsoever. Here one might feel PI, because of
the natural sensorimotor contingencies, but one would likely not feel Plausibility Illusion.
3.4.2 Can a participant experience Psi with no PI?
From the definitions, this would mean that the user believes that what is apparently
happening really is happening, but not that he is in a place. Based solely on these statements,
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it seems quite obvious that it is possible to experience Psi with no PI. A text adventure, for
example, could satisfy these requirements.
However, Slater goes on to argue that, “[A] key component of Psi is that events in the
virtual environment over which you have no direct control refer directly to you.” Is it possible
for events to refer directly to you in a scenario where you are not receiving “first-person view”
stimuli? I argue yes; in a text adventure, events still refer directly to the reader, which is
the representation of the user in the environment, and in a simple video game (Super Mario
Bros., for example) events refer to Mario, which is the user’s avatar.
Slater also argues that theater, as an example, is a medium that is able to induce Psi. This
would have at most limited PI (theater generally supports NO effective actions on the part
of the viewer, although it has the ability to support some sensorimotor actions). Potential
PI here would certainly be different here than in the above examples; whether more, less,
or just different depends on how effective and sensorimotor actions contribute to the overall
sensation of place.
3.5 PI, Psi, and priming in virtual environments
Coherence (and therefore Psi as well) is inextricably dependent on the particular scenario
being represented in the VE. For example, if one is specifically told that the VE represents a
real-world scenario (or, absent priming, the user expects “normal” behavior), and attempting
to jump sends your avatar soaring hundreds of feet in the air, this would be unexpected and
shocking behavior. However, if the user was told that this VE represents a future city on a
world with very low gravity, or that he is wearing special rocket boots, this would be normal
behavior, or at least plausible (in the traditional sense of the word) behavior. In the former
case, this startling behavior would be perceived as a failure of coherence and would decrease
the users feeling of Psi. But in the latter case, the very same behavior would be perceived as
a confirmation of the reality of the scenario as presented, and would likely increase the user’s
feeling of Psi.
Because a user’s feeling of Psi is so dependent on their expectations, I posit that appro-
priate priming can be used to increase (or decrease) the feeling of Psi in users. This notion
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(albeit regarding presence rather than Psi) is not new to the VE community. Nunez and
Blake (Nunez and Blake, 2003) performed an experiment where participants were primed by
reading a passage that was either relevant to the VE they were about to experience (e.g.,
a booklet about monastic history before experiencing a virtual monastery), or irrelevant to
the VE (e.g., the same booklet before experiencing a virtual hospital room). Their results
suggest that priming is not a primary driver of presence, but that it can act as a mediator
variable—that is, it amplifies the effect of different levels of immersion on presence. Steinicke
and colleagues (Steinicke et al., 2009) performed an experiment where participants were pre-
sented with a “transitional environment” (a virtual copy of the real lab) between the real
VR lab and the virtual environment. This can also be considered as priming the user for the
VE. They found that priming with the transitional environment produced more subjective
presence in a virtual airplane scenario, but did not observe a priming related difference in
physiological metrics.
I believe that appropriate priming can increase Psi, and therefore presence, by reducing or
eliminating “wrong” (or unintentionally surprising) events in the VE which can cause breaks
in Psi.
3.6 PI, Psi, and the “Book Problem”
One seemingly paradoxical effect observed by some presence researchers is that people
can experience presence in very low immersion environments: in the limit, people have been
observed to report presence from reading text. This phenomenon has been dubbed the “book
problem” (Biocca, 2002). It is my belief that Psi can at least partially explain the book
problem.
In my experiments (Chapter 5), I observed that subjective presence was affected by both
immersion and coherence separately, and most strongly when they were both high simulta-
neously. So coherence, and therefore most probably Psi, has an effect on users self-reported
presence. Anecdotally, coherence is generally much better in traditional media (books, films,
etc.). These media have many built-in advantages in this respect, in that they normally
contain a somewhat linear plot, and represent a singular point of view. Books can go even
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farther and offer written (but unspoken) justification for the actions of their characters. (A
corollary, then, would be that non-traditional films and literature would elicit less presence
than more traditional forms, but that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.)
This effect may be more clearly demonstrated in other very low immersion “virtual”
environments. Anecdotally, a game such as Super Mario Bros. has very low immersion—the
set of valid sensorimotor actions it supports consists only of the pressing of a half-dozen or
so buttons. However, it and its descendants remain popular and engrossing. I speculate that
this is due to the very clear and consistent rules of behavior in the game world. The controls
are very precise and responsive, if not entirely “realistic.” As one plays more, this matching
of stimulus to response, of expectation to realization, leads one to become more present in
the world it represents.
Another anecdote comes from my personal experience in improvised theater. Here, actors
generally have few, if any, props on stage. So if they desire a table for a scene, they create
it by force of imagination, by simply acting as if there is a table. With every action that
indicates that the table is real (walking around it, setting their imaginary drinks down on it,
scratching their characters’ initials into it), it becomes more real to the audience. However,
if one of the actors forgets the table is there and steps right through it, the illusion is broken.
There is also some evidence to support the idea that coherence can elicit the feeling of
presence in the psychology literature. Seth, Suzuki, and Critchley (Seth et al., 2012) propose a
neurocognitive model of presence that is based on the brain’s ability to successfully “explain”
discrepancies between sensorimotor predictions and observations. If the feeling of presence
arises more generally from the matching of predictions and observations, it is quite clear how
improved coherence should lead to a greater feeling of presence.
3.7 PI, Psi, and the “Uncanny Valley”
The concept of the “uncanny valley” has spread far beyond its original context of robotics.
Mori speculated about the appearance of entities, stating that in general, as an entity becomes
more humanlike in appearance, one experiences greater affinity for it In (Mori, 1970) (officially
translated into English in (Mori et al., 2012)). However, when an entity is almost—but not
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quite—humanlike, one experiences a negative affinity to it. This is the “uncanny valley” of
the title. He goes on to say that if the entity is moving, the effect is more pronounced. (We
may find a corpse disconcerting, but would find a zombie even more so.)
However, Mori does not make any mention of the quality or correctness of the motion, nor
does he mention the context in which it occurs. For example, he suggests that one would feel
quite high affinity for a bunraku puppet. I suggest that this is true only to the extent that
the behavior of the puppet conforms to expectations. Within the context of the theater, and
controlled by a skillful puppeteer, this is very likely the case. However, if one were to see a
bunraku puppet that appeared to be walking down the street unaided, I suspect it would be
a quite different story. Similarly, if the puppeteer were very poor, one would also experience
low affinity. I also suggest, perhaps counter-intuitively, that a puppet whose behavior was
too good (that is, too humanlike), would also have lower affinity than one that behaved just
right.
3.8 Extending the Uncanny Valley
The foregoing analysis also suggests a possible extension to the theory of the uncanny
valley that would apply generally to virtual environments.
In Mori’s discussion, it seems to me that the problem is not inherently the humanlike
appearance of an entity, but rather the mismatch between its appearance and its behavior.
Ishiguro has extended the concept of the uncanny valley with a “synergy effect” in this way
(essentially, the match between appearance and behavior) (Ishiguro, 2007). If an entity looks
exactly like a human and behaves exactly like a human, there should be no loss of affinity.
For all intents and purposes, it would be a human. (The question posed by a philosophical
zombie is beyond the scope of this dissertation.)
Following this logic, the uncanny valley theory no longer has to be restricted to humanoid
characters. One would likely feel more affinity for a dog character if it behaved like a real dog,
for example. And, going further, we can consider the environment itself as a character. If the
environment is treated as a character, I suspect that one would feel greater affinity for it if
its behavior matched its appearance. Furthermore, these characteristics of an environment—
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its behavior and its appearance (“appearance” in all sensory modalities)—map neatly onto
coherence and immersion.
There exists some supportive experimental evidence. In the Chapter 5 experiment, I
observed that matched conditions (low immersion with low coherence, and high immersion
with high coherence) resulted in higher scores on the SUS questionnaire than mismatched
conditions. In the matched conditions, the sensory representation of the environment and the
behavior of objects in it are of the same level of quality (whether good or bad), whereas in
the mismatched conditions, the scenario is highly immersive but behaves badly or vice versa.
While these results use presence rather than affinity, this may not be an actual difference.
In (Slater, 2004a), Slater presents the results of an experiment in which participants rated
the “colorfulness” of their day, which was associated with being “good”, “pleasant”, but “not
frustrating” in short, feelings of affinity. (His argument is specifically against reliance on
presence questionnaires, which, because they are the only tool available, may be confounding
affinity with presence. My research supports this notion.)
There is also evidence that users perform better when there is consistency within a virtual
scenario. Paul Zimmons’s dissertation, presents the results of a study investigating the effects
of lighting models on accuracy, speed, and recall in an object recognition task. Participants
were first shown a 3D knot object for ten seconds, and then were presented with a table on
which were fifteen 3D knot objects. The participant was asked to either identify the knot
object that had appeared in the training phase, or to indicate that the training object was
not on the table. (Zimmons called these objects the search object and the table objects; I will
call them the training and test objects here.) Each object (if training) or set of objects (if
test) was presented in one of three lighting conditions: ambient, local, or global illumination.
These conditions were varied across training and test pairs, so each pair represented a cell in
a 3x3 design (Zimmons, 2004). (See Table 3.1.)
Based on the previous discussions about the benefits of consistency in virtual environ-
ments, I hypothesize that task performance would be greater in the conditions in which the
training object and the test object share the same illumination condition.
Zimmons’s study provides a nice test case for this hypothesis, since as a 3x3 study, there
50
Figure 3.1: A bunraku puppet and puppeteer (image from (Renee, 2002), used under Creative
Commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/)
Table 3.1: The experimental conditions from Zimmons’s dissertation
Training object lighting model
Test objects lighting
model
Global Local Ambient
Global Consistent 1-off 2-off
Local 1-off Consistent 1-off
Ambient 2-off 1-off Consistent
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are multiple clearly gradated levels of inconsistency between the training and the test cases.
In this case we see, repeatedly, a behavior pattern consistent with this hypothesis.
When the metric is accuracy (Was the test object correctly identified?), participants were
correct significantly more often in consistent than inconsistent conditions. (76% to 63%, p
< .001) Even more tellingly, participants were correct significantly more often in consistent
conditions than inconsistent conditions in which the lighting models were one-off [see chart
above] (76% to 69%, p < 0.05), and participants in one-off conditions were correct significantly
more often than participants in two-off conditions (69% to 52%, p < .001)
When the metric was search time, a similar ordering was observed; participants in two-off
conditions were significantly slower (average search time of 7.7 seconds) than participants in
one-off (6.7, p < .01) or consistent (6.8, p < .05) conditions.
These orderings are consistent with what would my hypothesis predicts: as the training
and test conditions became more inconsistent (and therefore the mental model developed in
training was a worse predictor of the stimuli received in the test state), performance got both
slower and less accurate.
3.9 Summary of Theoretical Results
This chapter has presented new terminology (coherence and reasonable circumstances,
as they relate to Plausibility Illusion, as well as virtual scenario), and related PI and Psi to
other concepts and problems in virtual reality research. I argued that appropriate priming can
increase Plausibility Illusion, and therefore presence, and that the “book problem” is caused
by the coherence of events in the text giving rise to Plausibility Illusion. I also presented an
updated model of the “uncanny valley” taking into account not only appearance but behavior,
as in Ishiguro (Ishiguro, 2007), and then extended it to virtual environments generally by
arguing that immersion and coherence should be “matched” in quality, citing some previous
experimental results supporting this hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 4
Coherence of virtual human interactions
In this chapter, I discuss the design and results of an experiment investigating Plausibility
Illusion in virtual human interactions, in particular, the coherence of conversation with a
virtual human. This experiment was performed in combination with another experiment
evaluating two different display technologies. As that aspect of the study is not relevant to
this thesis, it will be mentioned only in the Materials section.
This was my first attempt to manipulate coherence in an experimental context, although
I hadn’t then defined coherence. This experiment is relevant to the dissertation not only
for that reason, but also for the lessons learned by attempting to manipulate coherence.
Most notably, the role of individual differences in users’ perception of coherence/feeling of
Plausibility Illusion is quite clear in this experiment. First, the design of the experiment had
to be completely changed to account for the fact that the voice recognition system produced
wildly varying levels of coherence based on the different voices and accents of users. Second,
the fact that users were highly motivated to use the system may have prevented me from
detecting a difference between the high-coherence and low-coherence groups on task metrics.
That said, there is some evidence that participants responded behaviorally to the difference in
coherence, even though it was not apparent in task completion or the majority of questionnaire
responses.
The virtual scenario used for this experiment as well as significant technical support were
provided by the Virtual Experiences Research Group (VERG) at the University of Florida,
led by Ben Lok. The implementation of the display portion of the experiment was done by
the Avatar research group at the University of North Carolina, led by Greg Welch and Henry
Fuchs.
4.1 Experiment
The experiment was a between-subjects design. Each participant performed one interview
with a virtual human patient who had come to a medical facility complaining of stomach
pain. The interviews lasted approximately ten minutes. For all participants, virtual human
responses were generated by an experimenter in a Wizard-of-Oz (WoZ) setup. Totally freeform
responses were not possible; the experimenter selected responses from a searchable list of
responses that had previously been recorded by a voice actor. The participant was not
aware that responses were being chosen by a real person; it appeared that the responses were
generated by voice recognition.
There were two experimental conditions. Specifically, the WoZ followed two different
behavior patterns. In the high-coherence condition, the experimenter responded to the par-
ticipant as quickly and as accurately as was possible. In the low-coherence condition, the
experimenter responded according to a script with a variety of conversational errors. The
different types of conversational errors were derived from (Skarbez et al., 2011). Since the
exact conversation could not be predicted in advance, the error script was of the form, “On
the fourth exchange, ignore the participant. On the ninth exchange, repeat the answer twice
in a row,” and so on. This ensured that all participants experienced a variety of types of
errors, and at a predictable frequency.
I had initially intended for the low-coherence condition to have responses selected by the
voice recognition software, and for the high-coherence condition to have responses selected by
the experimenter in a WoZ setup. Piloting, however, revealed problems with this experimental
setup, owing to the nature of the voice recognition software. Using it, some participants’
voices were almost perfectly recognized by the system, leading to very few errors, while some
other participants were almost unable to get the virtual patient to respond at all. In short,
there was no way to have a standardized amount of unreasonable circumstances occur in the
low-coherence condition using the voice recognition software.
Participants
Thirty-two medical school students (18 female, 14 male), with an average age of 25.8 2.3
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years, were recruited from the university medical school. They were compensated for their
participation.
Materials
The virtual human models, scripts, and voice recordings were provided by the Virtual
Experiences Research Group (VERG) at the University of Florida. Participants’ eye and
head positions were tracked during the experiment using an Optitrack optical tracking system.
Depending on the display condition, the virtual patient was rendered on a large 3DTV or was
embodied in a physical-virtual avatar (PVA), as shown in Figure 4.1. The PVA was initially
developed for use in another experiment (Rivera-Gutierrez et al., 2012). Both displays were
present in the room for all participants; whichever was not in use was covered with a black
cloth. The displays were placed so that the virtual patient in both display conditions would
subtend approximately the same visual angle from the participant’s seated position, which
was the same for all participants. This arrangement can be seen in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.1: At left, the physical-virtual avatar (PVA) apparatus. At right, the participant’s
view of the PVA when in use. The face is animated, computer-generated imagery projected
onto the inside of the plastic face. The projector can be seen in the center of Figure 4.1, Left.
Metrics
Participants filled out both pre- and post-experiment questionnaires, including demo-
graphic and medical training information, the Maastricht assessment of the simulated patient
(MaSP), a series of questions asking the participant to compare the VH interaction to other
types of interactions they may have had in everyday life, and a series of questions intended
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Figure 4.2: User performing an interview with the PVA. At left of image is the flat-panel
stereo display used in the other display condition
to measure the plausibility of the VH.
The MaSP is an instrument initially designed to assess the quality and authenticity of real
simulated patients, i.e., human actors who portray a patient with a given condition (Wind
et al., 2004). The MaSP has been modified and used to evaluate the quality of virtual human
simulated patients as well, as in (Johnsen et al., 2007) and (Raij et al., 2007).
We also recorded the positions of the eyes and torso for each participant during the
interaction, so that we could measure large-scale gaze behavior and postural response to
the virtual patient. The eye position was tracked using glasses with retroreflective markers
attached, which patients wore regardless of display condition. Note that we did not record
gaze behavior or employ eye tracking; the tracked point was roughly the center of the two
eyes, a point on the bridge of the nose.
4.2 Results
We performed Bayesian data analysis on the study data. In the Bayesian method of
analysis, all variables are considered as part of a single overall model, where all the stochastic
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equations are evaluated simultaneously, rather than one at a time. Non-informational priors
(normal functions with high variance) have been chosen so as not to bias the results. For
more details on this method, please consult Appendix A.
Unlike traditional null-hypothesis testing, there is no single value such as a p-value that
determines whether the result is significant. Instead, we report the posterior probabilities and
readers are free to interpret those probabilities for themselves. Posterior probabilities near
50% indicate that both outcomes are approximately equally likely, so we refer to posterior
probabilities between 50% and 70% as offering negligible evidence for the stated hypothesis.
Similarly, for convenience, we refer to probabilities above 70% as offering little evidence in
favor of a hypothesis, 75% as offering some evidence, probabilities above 80% as good evidence,
and probabilities above 90% as strong evidence. (These probabilities can also be less than
50%, providing evidence in the corresponding way for the inverse hypothesis.) This manner
of describing the results follows Bergstro¨m et al. (Bergstro¨m et al., 2016).
For the majority of measures, there is negligible evidence to support an effect of the of the
VH response coherence, of the display technology used, or of any covariants (age, semesters
in medical school, number of patient interviews, number of standardized patient interviews,
or self-rankings of anxiety, comfort, preparedness, or skill). Notably, the MaSP scores do not
reveal a difference between the low-coherence and high-coherence conditions. However, there
are a few results for which there is some evidence.
The posterior probability that participants in the low-coherence condition moved their
heads more than participants in the high coherence condition, as measured by the standard
deviation of head position, is 78.6%.
The posterior probability that participants in the low-coherence condition reported lower
scores to the question, ”How strongly did you sense that the patient was watching you?” than
participants in the high-coherence condition is 77.2%.
4.3 Discussion
The results described above indicate that participants detected the experimental manip-
ulation of coherence, at least at some level. Anecdotally, the experimenters noticed that
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participants in the low-coherence condition were more fidgety, and looked around the room
(and not at the virtual patient) more than participants in the high-coherence condition. This
observation is supported by the eye-position tracking data, in which the standard deviation
of eye position is very likely to be smaller for high-coherence participants than low-coherence
participants. Furthermore, the question, “How strongly did you sense that the patient was
watching you?” is the only question that directly asked about the behavioral response of
the virtual patient. In other words, it was the closest question available to, “Was the vir-
tual patient paying attention?” I speculate that participants used this question as a means
to say what they really noticed, which is that the virtual patient seemed less responsive to
their statements in the low-coherence condition. Neither of these observations is definitive
on its own, but in combination, I believe that this indicates that the lower coherence af-
fected participants, it just did not have an effect on task completion or on the other post-test
measures.
This result may have occurred because this group was highly motivated. Of the 32 par-
ticipants, 30 stated in post-experiment interviews that, regardless of display or coherence
condition, they would use the technology if it were available. The overwhelming feeling of
participants was that they thought interviewing with virtual simulated patients was useful
and they were excited about the potential of the technology. This feeling likely overcame
any difficulties or concerns about the implementation. This is good news for the prospect of
virtual human simulated patients in general, however, it may make the patient interview an
unsuitable use case for differential evaluation of technology.
More generally, this result provides additional evidence that user motivation can sup-
plement the technology, such that a more motivated, invested, or attentive user may feel
presence or demonstrate realistic response in a situation where a less motivated user might
not (Wirth et al., 2007). This is a boon for developers, because a user who is convinced that
new technology can help them do real work is likely to devote more attentional resources, and
this in turn will generate more presence, more realistic response, and more motivation in a
virtuous circle. It is a challenge for researchers, though, as they face the problem of high user
motivation obscuring experimental effects that might be more apparent with na¨ıve users.
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The difficulty of measuring a difference in Plausibility Illusion affected the design of later
studies, particularly the psychophysical study of coherence factors presented in Chapter 6.
The Markov Chain analyses used in that experiment ensure that usable data can be obtained
even from users who may “saturate” post-experiment self-report measures.
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CHAPTER 5
Immersion and coherence in the Pit
In this chapter, I report on the design and results of two experiments investigating Slater’s
Place Illusion (PI) and Plausibility Illusion (Psi) in a virtual visual cliff environment, the
Pit. PI (the illusion of being in a place) and Psi (the illusion that the depicted events are
actually happening) were proposed by Slater as orthogonal components of virtual experience
which contribute to realistic response in a VE. To that end, I identified characteristics of a
virtual reality experience that we expected to influence one or the other of PI and Psi. I
designed two experiments in which each participant experienced a given VE in one of four
conditions chosen from a 2x2 design: high or low levels of PI-eliciting characteristics and
high or low levels of Psi-eliciting characteristics. I collected both questionnaire-based and
physiological metrics. Several existing presence questionnaires could not reliably distinguish
the effects of PI from those of Psi. They did, however, indicate that high levels of PI-eliciting
characteristics and Psi-eliciting characteristics together result in higher presence, compared
any of the other three conditions. This suggests that “breaks in PI” and “breaks in Psi”
belong to a broader category of “breaks in experience,” any of which result in a degraded
user experience. Participants’ heart rates, however, responded markedly differently in the
two Psi conditions; no such difference was observed across the PI conditions. This indicates
that a VE that exhibits unusual or confusing behavior can cause stress in a user that affects
physiological responses, and that one must take care to eliminate such confusing behaviors if
one is using physiological measurement as a proxy for subjective experience in a VE.
Because this chapter was originally written as a stand-alone article, it contains some text
that repeats ideas presented previously in this dissertation.
5.1 PI:Immersion::Psi:Coherence
In (Slater, 2009), Slater states, “Immersion provides the boundaries within which PI can
occur.” Immersion, here, is defined in terms of the set of sensorimotor valid actions supported
by the system. Valid actions are those actions that a user can perform that result in changes
to his perception or to the state of the VE, such as moving his viewpoint. By this definition
immersion is strictly a function of system characteristics and possible user actions (Slater
and Wilbur, 1997). Strictly speaking, then, our experimental factor is not PI, but rather
immersion as so defined.
A parallel argument can be made regarding Psi. Psi arises to the extent that a participant
probes the Psi-inducing (or the Psi-breaking) characteristics of the environment. While the
concept of immersion is well-established in the VE research community, there does not exist
an equivalent concept for reasoning about the degree to which the virtual scenario behaves
in a reasonable or predictable way. We use the term coherence for this concept.
In our experiments, we sought to identify measures that could distinguish between the
effects of PI and those of Psi on participants. We designed between-subjects experiments
where the factors were different levels of immersion and coherence that were expected to
elicit differing levels of PI and Psi, respectively. Henceforth, these factors will be referred to
as LowPI and HighPI, and LowPsi and HighPsi, respectively.
We sought to identify system characteristics that would affect only (or, at least, mainly)
one or the other of immersion or coherence. Broadly, immersion factors deal with the physical
interface between the user and the VE, e.g. tracking, display, and input devices or techniques.
Coherence factors deal with the appropriateness of the scenario and of interactions between
system users, virtual characters, and virtual objects; e.g. world physics, behavior of virtual
humans, and “glitches.”
Note that coherence (and therefore Psi as well) is inextricably dependent on the particular
scenario being represented in the VE. For example, if one is specifically told that the VE
represents a real-world scenario (or, absent priming, the user expects “normal” behavior),
and attempting to jump sends your avatar soaring hundreds of feet in the air, this would be
unexpected and shocking behavior. However, if the user was told that this VE represents a
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future city on a world with very low gravity, or that he is wearing special rocket boots, this
would be normal behavior, or at least plausible behavior. In the former case, this startling
behavior would be perceived as a failure of coherence and would decrease the user’s feeling of
Psi. But in the latter case, the very same behavior would be perceived as a confirmation of
the reality of the scenario presented, and would likely increase the user’s feeling of Psi.
5.2 Experiment 1
This experiment used a 2x2 between-subjects design with multiple outcome measures.
We chose a between-subjects design because Khanna and colleagues observed (Khanna et al.,
2006) that responses were not symmetric across conditions in a visual cliff experiment such as
the one used here. That is, the difference in effect between the first exposure and subsequent
exposures to the visual cliff stressor cannot be entirely compensated for by counterbalancing
order. Also, Meehan exposed participants to a visual cliff environment twelve times over
four days (Meehan, 2001), finding that physiological responses decreased with subsequent
exposures, but not to zero.
In this first experiment, a single system characteristic was varied to create different levels
of immersion and coherence. The Immersion factor was manipulated by changing the effective
field of view of the head-mounted display (HMD). In the HighPI conditions, the field of view
was 60◦ diagonal, the maximum supported by the HMD. In the LowPI conditions, a virtual
mask reduced the effective field of view to 30◦ diagonal. By construction, changing the field
of view must change the level of immersion, because it changes the sensorimotor actions
supported by the system. For example, a user in the restricted field of view condition might
have to turn his head to see a virtual object that a user in the normal field of view condition
could see without any head movement at all. Hendrix and Barfield showed that field of view
has a significant effect on presence (defined in that paper as “being there”, which corresponds
to PI), and Arthur also observed that presence scores trended lower with restricted field
of view (Hendrix and Barfield, 1996a) (Arthur, 2000). Slater and colleagues showed that
participants who were explicitly trying to increase PI improved field of view significantly
more often than participants who were trying to increase Psi (Slater et al., 2010). Note that
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the behavior of the environment remains unchanged regardless of the field of view condition.
Based on the definitions of PI and Psi, this manipulation should therefore have no effect on
Psi.
The Coherence factor was manipulated by changing the physical behavior of the environ-
ment. In (Slater, 2009), Slater theorized that a key component of Plausibility Illusion was the
“correlational principle”. That is, events occurring in the environment should react or appear
to react in response to the user’s actions in the environment. This experiment attempted to
directly manipulate the participant’s sense of this correlation. Participants were instructed at
several points that they must perform a task in order to advance to the next stage of the ex-
periment. In the HighPsi conditions, these instructions were true: advancement through the
experiment depended upon participant behavior. In the LowPsi conditions, the instructions
were false: the advancement events were controlled by a software timer, and the participant’s
actions had no effect. There were three such events: participants were told that when they
finished dropping ten balls into a receptacle, the elevator would arrive to take them to the
next room, that the elevator would descend when they pressed the correct button, and that
the door to the visual cliff room would open when they picked up a ball from a particular
pedestal.
There is no experimental precedent for modifying the behavior of the environment in
response to user’s actions in such a way in order to manipulate Psi. As above, however, from
the definitions of PI and Psi, we argue that changing the environment’s behavior should have
no effect whatsoever on PI; if it has any effect at all, it must be on Psi.
A metric that could distinguish between the effects of PI and the effects of Psi would
show a substantial difference between measured values in the LowPI-HighPsi condition and
the HighPI-LowPsi condition, that is, the cross diagonal in the 2x2 design. In these conditions,
the participant is expected to feel a high level of either PI and Psi, and a low level of the other.
Differences along the main diagonal (Low-Low, High-High) would indicate only whether a
strictly “better” VE differs from a strictly “worse” one. We designed our conditions on
the cross diagonal to represent experiences that are overall of approximately the same level
of quality. A measure that exhibits a difference between these conditions, then, would be
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evidence that that measure responds differently to PI and Psi, and therefore, that PI and Psi
are separable constructs.
5.2.1 Participants
Thirty-two participants (8 female, 24 male) took part in this experiment. All were re-
cruited from an introductory undergraduate psychology class and received course credit. Their
average age was 19.5 years. Participants successfully passed screening for uncorrected vision
problems, a history of seizures or strong motion sickness, inability to walk without assistance,
deafness, self-reported pregnancy, and English comprehension.
5.2.2 Materials
The experiment took place in an immersive virtual environment. Participants wore an
nVisor SX HMD with 1280x1024 resolution per eye and native 60◦ diagonal field-of-view, with
attached stereo headphones. The head and right hand of each participant were tracked using
the 3rdTech Hiball 3000 optical tracking system. Participant physiological reactions were
measured using the ProComp Infiniti wireless telemetry system from Thought Technologies,
Ltd. A Pentium D dual-core 2.8GHz computer with an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 280 GPU
and 4GB RAM rendered the virtual environment and recorded logs. The application was
implemented using the UNC-developed EVEIL2 library that communicates with the Game-
bryo software game engine from Gamebase USA. The Virtual Reality Peripheral Network
(VRPN) interface handled tracker communication and logging of physiological signals and
tracker data.
5.2.3 Metrics
Participants’ experiences were evaluated using both in-test and post-test metrics. During
the test, we collected electrocardiogram (EKG), skin conductance (SCR), and skin tempera-
ture. For both SCR and skin temperature, the mean and standard deviation were computed
for each stage of the experiment. From the EKG data, several measures of heart rate vari-
ability (HRV) were computed. Candidate R spikes were identified algorithmically, and the
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signals were then processed by hand to ensure that the time stamps of those spikes were
recorded correctly. These data were then used to compute metrics in both the time domain
(mean R-R time interval, mean heart rate, and percentage of R-R intervals that are less than
10/30/50ms) and the frequency domain (power in the low-frequency band (LF), power in the
high-frequency band (HF), and the LF/HF ratio) domains. These metrics were also computed
for each stage of the experiment.
The frequency domain analysis merits further discussion. The distribution of power as
a function of frequency is computed by power spectral density (PSD) analysis of the time
series of R spikes. The HRV literature defines the low-frequency band as 0.04-0.15 Hz, and
the high-frequency band as 0.15-0.4 Hz. The physiological significance of these bands is
that both sympathetic nerve activity (reflecting stress) and parasympathetic nerve activity
(reflecting rest/normal conditions) increase LF spectral power, but only parasympathetic
nerve activity increases HF spectral power. An increase in the LF/HF ratio, then, indicates
that the participant is experiencing increased stress.
Post-test, participants completed the Witmer-Singer Presence Questionnaire (Witmer and
Singer, 1998), the Slater-Usoh-Steed Presence Score (Usoh et al., 2000), the Virtual Expe-
rience Tool of Chertoff, Goldiez, and LaViola (Chertoff et al., 2010), the Arrival/Departure
questionnaire of Kim and Biocca (Kim and Biocca, 1997), as well as a short experimental
questionnaire intended to measure participants’ levels of Psi, whose questions are listed in
Table 5.1. Note that the Psi questionnaire is ad hoc and was constructed for this experiment.
At this point, I can only argue for its face validity for responding to Psi. All participants
were also debriefed by an experimenter.
Table 5.1: Ad hoc Plausibility Illusion questionnnaire
The environment’s behavior was the same as I would expect in the real world.
I could anticipate how the environment would respond to my actions.
The environment’s behavior was surprising or unexpected.
The environment’s behavior was inconsistent.
I forgot that the environment was virtual.
The behaviors of the environment were appropriate.
Interacting with the Pit environment was the same as interacting with a real environment.
Interacting with the VE was more like interacting with. . . (1: a video game, 7: a real room)
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5.2.4 Experimental Procedures
Upon arriving, participants first reported to an office, where they were screened by an
experimenter, signed informed-consent forms, and completed pre-experiment questionnaires
on a PC using the Qualtrics web application (Qualtrics, Provo UT). After completing the
questionnaire, participants were equipped with the ProComp Infiniti and escorted to the lab,
where they donned the NVIS HMD and started the experiment.
The experiment itself consisted of three stages (Figure 5.1 shows the common environ-
ment.):
Stage 1. Participants familiarized themselves with the virtual environment by picking up,
carrying, and dropping balls into receptacles.
Stage 2. Participants took a virtual elevator to an office-like environment, where they were
presented with additional balls to drop on targets.
Stage 3. The door to the Pit room opened and participants were exposed to the virtual
visual cliff environment, where there were several more balls to drop on targets on the floor
below.
The experiment ended when participants re-entered the office-like room from the Pit room.
The total time in the virtual environment was approximately ten minutes.
Participants then doffed the HMD and the ProComp hardware, and returned to the office,
where they filled out post-test questionnaires on the PC and were debriefed orally.
5.2.5 Results
Experiment 1 failed to identify any metrics that significantly distinguished between PI
effects and Psi effects. Analysis identified several possible reasons why that experiment failed
to generate a significant result, even if PI and Psi are in fact distinguishable in outcome mea-
sures. The most likely reason is that the factor levels in that experiment were not sufficiently
different, so that individual differences obscured any effect. We addressed those concerns in
a subsequent experiment, described in the next section.
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Figure 5.1: The virtual environment for Experiment 1.
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5.3 Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, only a single system characteristic was manipulated to create the two
levels of each factor. Immersion and coherence, though, are both multi-dimensional con-
structs. For example, immersion depends on the combination of multiple sensory modalities
(visual, auditory, tactile, etc.), and each of these sensory modalities is dependent on multiple
system characteristics (for the visual channel, field of view, display resolution, display size,
display latency, etc.). It is possible that the two levels of immersion in Experiment 1 were
sufficiently close together in this multi-dimensional immersion space that there was no prac-
tical distinction to participants. A similar rationale applies for coherence. For Experiment
2, multiple system characteristics were varied simultaneously to create more sharply distinct
high and low levels of immersion and coherence.
We argue that there are several meaningful categories of immersion failures. One, reduced
fidelity, occurs when the sensory data stream is somehow impoverished—for example, a limited
field of view or monophonic sound. Another, sensory conflict, occurs when sensory data from
different modalities conflict—for example, a participant is experiencing a virtual spacewalk,
but is hearing the sounds from the office or lab she is actually in. A third, missing or
invalid cues, occurs when the sensory data stream is interrupted, or contains invalid data—for
example, when tracking is lost. In this experiment, then, the immersion factor is manipulated
as follows: In the HighPI conditions, the field of view of the HMD will be the maximum
supported by the device (60◦ diagonal), passive haptics will be used to provide tactile feedback
to the participant, and scenario-appropriate spatial sound cues will appear in the environment.
In the LowPI conditions, the effective field of view of the HMD will be restricted to 30◦ by
use of a virtual mask, no passive haptics will be used, and there will be no sound other than
the experimental instructions delivered through the headphones.
Failures of coherence can also be meaningfully categorized. Physical coherence can fail—
that is, the laws of physics as we know them do not seem to apply, e.g., an object falls
through the virtual floor, a rolling ball is never slowed by friction. Also, narrative coherence
can fail—virtual characters or the scenario itself do not abide by the expected rules of behavior
from everyday life, e.g., a character performs repetitive actions or otherwise does not respond
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meaningfully to your presence, actions that you are led to believe will cause one event in fact
cause a different event.
In this experiment, then, the coherence factor is manipulated as follows: In the HighPsi
case, physical objects (balls) behave as one would expect them to, and the experimental
instructions are in fact valid. In the LowPsi case, physical objects behave in an apparently
random fashion (dropped balls can fall with normal acceleration due to gravity, accelerate
much faster or much slower than normal, remain stationary, or float slowly upward), and the
experimental instructions are false (the scoreboard which claims to show the number of balls
you have dropped in fact never changes, the elevator teleports instantly rather than seeming
to work as a normal elevator, and the door which claims to open when an object is moved in
fact operates on a timer, forcing the participant to wait).
Regarding individual differences among participants, several of the most promising met-
rics that may be able to distinguish the effects of PI and Psi are heart rate variability (HRV)
metrics. These include mean heart rate, power in different frequency bands of the electrocar-
diogram (EKG) signal, and variability of the beat-to-beat interval. Analysis of these metrics
following the Experiment 1 showed no significant main effects. Discussion with an HRV ex-
pert, however, indicated that these metrics vary wildly from person to person based on a
variety of personal characteristics, including age, sex, weight, physical fitness, among others.
As a result, comparing aggregate HRV metrics for a heterogeneous group is unlikely to yield
any meaningful result. Therefore, in an effort to reduce individual differences within the par-
ticipant pool, participation in Experiment 2 was restricted to non-smoking, non-drug-using
undergraduate males, ages 18-22, who exercise 3-5 times per week.
5.3.1 Participants
Thirty-two male participants took part in this experiment. The average age was 20.1
years. Participants were additionally screened as in Experiment 1.
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5.3.2 Materials
The materials are the same as in Experiment 1, except that the virtual environment has
an additional room, as described in 5.3.4.
5.3.3 Metrics
During the experiment, participants physiological responses were monitored as in Ex-
periment 1. Post-test, participants completed the Witmer-Singer Presence Questionnaire
(Witmer and Singer, 1998) and a modified Slater-Usoh-Steed Presence Score (Usoh et al.,
2000).
5.3.4 Experimental Procedures
Participants underwent pre-experiment screening, filled out consent forms and question-
naires, and donned the VR equipment, all as in Experiment 1.
This experiment consisted of five stages. (An illustration of the environment is in Figure
5.2.):
Stage 1. Participants familiarized themselves with the virtual environment, playing a Simon-
like memory game. Stages 2, 3, and 4 are similar to the three stages in Experiment 1.
Stage 2. Participants took a virtual elevator to a room where they had to pick up balls and
drop them in targeted receptacles.
Stage 3. Participants took a virtual elevator to an office-like environment, where they were
presented with additional balls to drop on targets.
Stage 4. The door to the Pit room opened and participants were exposed to the virtual
visual cliff environment, where there were several more balls to drop on targets on the floor
below.
Stage 5. Participants returned to the elevator, returned to the Simon room, and played the
game again. After 3 minutes, the experiment ended. The total time in the virtual environment
was approximately fifteen minutes.
Participants then doffed the HMD and the ProComp hardware, and returned to the office,
where they filled out post-test questionnaires on the PC and were debriefed orally, all as in
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Figure 5.2: The virtual environment for Experiment 2.
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Experiment 1.
5.4 Experiment 2 Results
We performed Bayesian data analysis on the study data. In the Bayesian method of
analysis, all variables are considered as part of a single overall model, where all the stochastic
equations are evaluated simultaneously, rather than one at a time. For justification and more
details of the method, please consult Appendix A. Unlike traditional analysis, that is, null-
hypothesis testing, there is no single value such as a p-value that determines whether the
result is “significant”. Instead, I simply report the posterior probabilities.
In the remainder of this section, we present the results organized as claims about the data
grouped with the supporting evidence for each claim.
5.4.1 There is good evidence that the Witmer-Singer Presence Questionnaire
responds to higher levels of immersion as a main effect.
This may be somewhat unsurprising, as Place Illusion is quite closely related to traditional
notions of presence, which is what the PQ was designed to measure. Nonetheless, there is
an 80.5% probability that participants in HighPI conditions reported higher PQ scores than
participants in LowPI conditions.
Table 5.2: Mean count of high scores (6 or 7) on the Witmer-Singer PQ for each condition
LowPI HighPI
LowPsi 9.6 10.4
HighPsi 10.0 12.9
Table 5.3: Mean count of high scores (6 or 7) on the SUS questionnaire for each condition
LowPI HighPI
LowPsi 4.0 2.9
HighPsi 3.3 4.3
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5.4.2 There is negligible evidence that the Slater-Usoh-Steed presence
questionnaire (SUS) responds to increased immersion as a main effect.
The posterior probability that participants in the HighPI conditions reported higher scores
than participants in the LowPsi conditions is 52.1%.
5.4.3 There is little evidence that either questionnaire responds to increased
coherence as a main effect.
The probabilities that participants in the HighPsi conditions reported higher question-
naire scores than participants in the LowPsi conditions are 61.7% and 71.3% on the SUS
questionnaire and the PQ, respectively.
5.4.4 When high levels of PI and Psi are present together, questionnaire scores
increase.
For each of the SUS and the PQ questionnaires, there is at least some evidence that partic-
ipants in the HighPI-HighPsi condition reported higher scores than in any of the other three
conditions. On the SUS questionnaire, the posterior probability is 79.8% that participants in
the HighPI-HighPsi condition scored higher than participants in the other three conditions
combined; for the PQ questionnaire, there is strong evidence, with a 96.7% probability that
participants in the HighPI-HighPsi condition scored higher. (See Tables 5.2 and 5.3 for mean
scores.)
5.4.5 There is good evidence that SUS questionnaire scores are higher for matched
(LowPI-LowPsi and HighPI-HighPsi) than mismatched conditions.
There is 86.6% probability that SUS scores are higher for participants in the matched
conditions than in the mismatched conditions. There is little evidence for this effect on the
PQ, with a 66.1% posterior probability.
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5.4.6 There is good evidence that several PQ subscores respond differently to
immersion and coherence.
There is good evidence (86.9% posterior probability) that the PQ Naturalness subscore
is higher for participants in the HighPsi conditions than the LowPsi conditions. There is
negligible evidence (54.2%) that it responds to immersion.
On the other hand, there is good evidence that both the audio (85.1%) and haptic (83.3%)
subscores are higher for participants in HighPI conditions (HighPI-LowPsi and HighPI-
HighPsi combined) than in LowPI conditions (LowPI-LowPsi and LowPI-HighPsi combined).
5.4.7 There is strong evidence that exposure to bad coherence (i.e.,
glitches) causes heart rate to increase.
In Stage 1 of the experiment, coherence was the same for all participants. This stage was
used to measure the baseline heart rate for all participants. In Stage 2, though, participants
in the LowPsi conditions were exposed to a series of coherence failures, while those in the
HighPsi conditions were not. There is strong evidence that LowPsi participants experienced
an increase in heart rate in Stage 2, with a posterior probability of 87.1%. (See Figure 5.3.)
Figure 5.3: Comparing coherence conditions by heart rate in each experimental stage.
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5.4.8 There is negligible evidence that the increase in heart rate caused by
exposure to the Pit is dependent on either PI or Psi separately.
The effect of the Pit on heart rate can be considered either by comparing to the baseline
(Stage 4 - Stage 1) or to the previous stage (Stage 4 - Stage 3). In neither case is it probable
that the size of the increase is greater for HighPI vs. LowPI (38.4%, 46.3%), or for HighPsi
vs. LowPsi (59.9%, 38.9%).
5.4.9 There is little evidence that the ad-hoc Psi questionnaire administered
here responds to increased coherence, but negligible evidence that it re-
sponds to increased immersion.
There is only little evidence that the experimental Psi questionnaire (from Table 1) re-
sponds to higher coherence (71.0%). That said, it is more probable that it responds to
coherence than immersion, for which there is negligible evidence (51.1%). Further, there
is some evidence that it does respond to both higher immersion and higher coherence to-
gether (79.4%), and some evidence that it responds negatively to higher immersion and lower
coherence together (22.1%).
Figure 5.4: Comparing immersion conditions by heart rate in each experimental stage.
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Figure 5.5: Comparing all four conditions by heart rate in each experimental stage.
5.5 Discussion
As stated above, we observed that participants have higher PQ and SUS questionnaire
scores when both presence and immersion are high; none of the other conditions is sub-
stantially different from another. This demonstrates that when coherence and immersion
are present together, participants report significantly higher levels of presence. Further, the
scores for LowPI-HighPsi and HighPI-LowPsi conditions are not substantially different, which
may indicate that both PI and Psi are of roughly equal importance, at least as regards scores
on the PQ. Furthermore, neither of these is substantially different from the LowPI-LowPsi
condition, indicating that any noticeable failure of either immersion or coherence causes a
substantial drop in presence.
In comparing these observations to previous studies measuring the relative influences of
different aspects of experience on presence using self-report methods, these are in line with
those of Lessiter et al. (Lessiter et al., 2001). That paper suggested that immersion factors
and coherence factors contributed roughly equally to presence. On the other hand, our results
agree less with those of Schubert and Regenbrecht (Schubert and Regenbrecht, 1999), which
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suggested that immersion factors contributed roughly twice as much as coherence factors.
(Note that neither of the papers mentioned above described their factors in terms of PI and
Psi. Each reported a list of factors and the associated amount of variance they explained, and
I have characterized those factors as either immersion or coherence as follows. From Lessiter et
al., we consider Sense of Physical Space and Negative Effects—explaining a combined 19.6%
of variance—to compose immersion, and Engagement and Ecological Validity—18.6%—to
compose coherence. From Schubert et al., we consider Spatial Presence, Immersion Quality,
Interface Awareness, and Exploration Factors—explaining a combined 34% of variance—to
compose immersion, and Involvement, Drama, Predictability and Interaction, and Realness—
16%—to compose coherence.)
The observation that there is no substantial difference among any of the non-HighPI-
HighPsi conditions echoes previous arguments that presence is a binary construct, that either
one has it or one doesn’t. Those arguments focused on presence as a moment-to-moment
sensation, though: At any given moment, the thinking goes, you are present in exactly one
place, whether it is the virtual environment or the real world lab or an imaginary space. What
was observed in this study, though, is something different. Here, if your experience is “good
enough,” participants remember and report a high level of presence after the fact, and if it is
not, then they report a lower level. This suggests that self-report and/or post-facto measures
of presence, at least, favor experiences that are of a consistent level of acceptable quality, and
penalize experiences that have failures, glitches, or breaks that draw a users attention and can
linger in the memory. This provides a piece of practical advice for designers and builders of
virtual reality systems: Only build those features into a VE or a virtual environment system
which you are capable of doing well. Adding virtual humans to an environment, for example,
might actually reduce the quality of an experience and lower a user’s feeling of presence if in
the process distracting or unnatural behavior is also introduced.
The evidence that matched conditions result in higher scores on the SUS questionnaire
than mismatched conditions may further suggest an effect where users prefer an environment
of consistent quality (whether high or low) to one that is inconsistent. In the matched
conditions, the sensory representation of the environment and the behavior of objects in it
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are of the same level of quality (whether good or bad), while in the mismatched conditions,
the environment looks realistic but behaves badly or vice versa. This difference is evidence
that consistency and predictability are more important to users—at least as far as the feeling
of presence is concerned—than having the best possible environment, if that level of quality
cannot be maintained throughout. These effects lend credence to the “uncanny valley” effect
proposed in Section 3.8
Figure 5.6 depicts the skin conductance response for each condition and each stage. No-
table is the fact that the LowPsi conditions do not exhibit a spike in Stage 2 as was seen in
heart rate. Skin conductance has generally been considered to be less suitable as a measure
of stress in virtual environment due to its slow onset and slow decay (Meehan, 2001). How-
ever, these results suggest that it might be useful to gather this information, as heart rate is
affected by both stressful and confusing situations, whereas skin conductance seems only to
respond to stress.
Figure 5.6: Comparing all four conditions by skin conductance response in each experimental
stage.
Coherence was also considered by Biocca and colleagues in (Biocca et al., 2001), although
not under that name. In the experiment described in that paper, participants performed a
similar task (removing objects from a cadaver) in an ecologically-valid environment where
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the objects were organs, and in a control environment where the objects were geometric
primitives. This scenario-appropriateness is an aspect of coherence that was not explored in
this paper, but merits consideration in future work.
5.6 Conclusion
These studies began as an attempt to identify metrics that would enable us to reliably
measure and distinguish between the effects of Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion. No
such metrics were identified; however, other effects were observed, including that PI and Psi
together result in higher presence scores, that matched coherence and immersion levels may
lead to higher levels of presence, and that low coherence can cause increased heart rate.
As with the study presented in Chapter 4, the difficulty of measuring a difference in
Plausibility Illusion informed the design of the psychophysical study of coherence factors
presented in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
Factors of coherence and Psi
In this chapter, I report on the design and results of an experiment investigating factors
influencing Slater’s Plausibility Illusion (Psi) in virtual environments. Slater proposed Psi
and Place Illusion (PI) as orthogonal components of virtual experience which contribute to
realistic response in a VE. PI corresponds to the traditional conception of presence as “be-
ing there,” so there exists a substantial body of previous research relating to PI, but very
little relating to Psi. I developed this experiment to investigate the components of plau-
sibility illusion using subjective matching techniques similar to those used in color science,
and previously used in (Slater et al., 2010). Twenty-one participants each experienced a
scenario with the highest level of coherence (the extent to which a scenario matches user
expectations and is internally consistent), then in eight different trials chose transitions from
lower-coherence to higher-coherence scenarios with the goal of matching the level of Psi they
felt in the highest-coherence scenario. At each transition, participants could change one of the
following coherence characteristics: the behavior of the other virtual humans in the environ-
ment, the behavior of their own body, the physical behavior of objects, or the appearance of
the environment. Participants tended to choose improvements to the virtual body before any
other improvements. This indicates that having an accurate and well-behaved representation
of oneself in the virtual environment is the most important contributing factor to Psi.
This study is the first to focus specifically on coherence factors in virtual environments.
This experiment was conducted at, and with significant support from, the Experimental
Virtual Environments (EVENT) Lab at the Universitat de Barcelona, led by Mel Slater.
6.1 Experiment
This experiment is similar in methodology to the experiment described by Slater et al. in
(Slater et al., 2010). In that experiment, participants were placed in the system configuration
with the highest level of immersion, instructed to remember either their feeling of PI or
their feeling of Psi, and then match whichever feeling they were instructed to remember
by choosing transitions from lower- to higher-order systems. In this experiment, I followed
the same method, but was only concerned with Psi, so no participants were instructed to
remember their feelings of PI.
In this experiment, the property vector was C = {VH, VB, P, S}, where VH refers to
the coherence of virtual human behavior, VB the behavior of one’s own virtual body, P
the coherence of physical interactions in the VE, and S the scenario coherence. These are
elucidated further below. We refer to each instance of the property vector as a configuration.
We chose the factors in the property vector in order to have a reasonable covering of
the different types of coherence (and coherence failures) that can be present in a virtual
environment. Virtual humans were chosen as one of the factors to represent the coherence
of interaction with other characters in the virtual environment. The user’s virtual body was
chosen as another factor. In the real world, there is a justifiably strong feeling of agency—the
sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action (Russell, 1996)—especially
when it comes to the behavior of one’s own body. Therefore, we would expect the presence or
absence of the virtual body, and the coherence of its behavior if present, to have a strong effect
on one’s level of plausibility illusion. Physical interactions (kicking a football) were chosen to
represent the coherence of allowed interactions with the virtual environment. Finally, scenario
coherence (the matching of the virtual environment to the represented situation) was chosen
to represent any other factors, outside of specific interactions with characters or objects in
the virtual environment, that may lead one to disbelieve the virtual environment as a whole.
As an example, absent priming, participants are likely to expect the virtual environment to
behave according to the rules of the real world. Those expectations can be violated in subtle
ways by behavior that is technically valid, but feels “wrong.” For example, consider a scenario
set in the desert at mid-day, where all behavior is technically perfect, except the other virtual
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characters are wearing winter coats.
VH (Virtual human behavior coherence)
In all trials, there are three virtual humans in the environment with the participant: a
bartender, and two young men having a conversation. After approximately 30 seconds of
conversation, one of the men excuses himself to go to the bathroom, requiring him to cross in
front of the participant. The specific behavior of these virtual humans depends on the value
of VH.
(VH=0) Worst behavior. All virtual humans have only idle animations while talking, and
remain in the same place. (That is, neither virtual patron crosses to the bathroom.)
(VH=1) Medium behavior. Virtual humans have realistic conversation and walking ani-
mations. When crossing in front of the participant, the crossing VH does not stop or
acknowledge the participant.
(VH=2) Best behavior. Virtual humans have realistic conversation and walking animations.
When crossing in front of the participant, the crossing VH stops, looks at the participant,
and addresses the participant directly about their football playing.
VB (Virtual body behavior coherence)
The appearance and behavior of the participant’s avatar could be changed. The different
possible levels of the participant’s avatar are described below.
(VB=0) Feet-only avatar. In this condition, the participant is represented in the environ-
ment only by their feet. (See Figure 6.2.) This condition, rather than having no visible
representation in the environment, was chosen to enable participants to meaningfully
perform the task of interacting with the football. The feet are fully tracked as, as they
are in the other VB levels.
(VB=1) Static avatar. In this condition, the participant is represented in the environment
by a gender-appropriate avatar in a seated T-pose. (See Figure 6.3.) The avatar’s legs
move with the participant’s; the torso and arms, however, do not move.
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Figure 6.1: Virtual humans in level 2. Note eye contact.
(VB=2) Fully-tracked avatar. In this condition, the participant is represented in the envi-
ronment by a fully body-tracked gender-appropriate avatar. The avatar pose is driven
by real-time input from the optical tracking system, as described below.
P (Physical coherence)
In all trials, participants were directed to play with and control a football between their
feet. The behavior of the ball when kicked was determined by the value of P.
(P=0) Null behavior. When the ball was kicked, the force vector applied to the ball was
cancelled out by an opposite force vector. In practice, this meant that the ball could
be moved while it was in contact with the foot, but it would never roll or maintain
momentum once out of contact with the foot.
(P=1) Semi-normal behavior. When the ball was kicked, it would randomly either behave
as if it were in level P=0 or level P=2, with equal likelihood. In practice, this meant
that the ball would behave normally 50% of the time, and not move 50% of the time.
(P=2) Normal behavior. When the ball was kicked, the physics engine was used to determine
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Figure 6.2: Virtual body in level 0 (Only feet)
Figure 6.3: Virtual body in level 1. Torso fixed in T-pose visible in the mirror.
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the path of the ball.
S (Scenario coherence) For all trials, the participant was in a virtual bar environment
of the same physical configuration (tables and chairs in the same positions, mirror hanging
on the wall facing the participant, etc.), but the representation of those objects changed
depending on the value of S.
(S=0) Abstract appearance. All models in the environment are replaced with simple geo-
metric primitives. (See Figure 6.4.)
(S=1) Mismatched appearance. The environment model is of an upscale restaurant. (See
Figure 6.5.)
(S=2) Matched appearance. The environment model is of a bar. (See Figure 6.6.)
Figure 6.4: Abstract environment (Scenario level 0)
Altogether, there are 81 possible configurations: 3 physical coherence x 3 scenario coher-
ence x 3 virtual human coherence x 3 virtual body coherence.
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Figure 6.5: Mismatched environment, appearing to be an upscale restaurant (Scenario level
1)
Figure 6.6: Matched environment, appearing to be a bar (Scenario level 2)
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6.1.1 Participants
Twenty-one participants (10 males, 11 females) were recruited from the local university
campus. Their average age was 24±5 (S.D.) years and they were compensated for their time.
6.1.2 Materials
The virtual environment was displayed using an Oculus Rift Development Kit 2 (DK2)
head-mounted display (HMD) made by Oculus (Figure 7). The DK2 has a nominal 100◦ field
of view, and a resolution of 960 x 1080 pixels per eye. It weighs 440 grams.
Figure 6.7: The Oculus Rift DK2 HMD
For head tracking, the internal tracking of the DK2 was used, with an update rate of
1000Hz. For body tracking, participants wore an Optitrack body suit (Figure 6.8), designed
to support real-time whole body tracking of a person. It consists of a black suit with 37
retroreflective markers, which are tracked by 12 infrared cameras. Tracking was handled by
the Optitrack Motive software platform.
The experiment was implemented in version 5.2 of the Unity Game Engine. The male
and female avatars were created using Mixamo.
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Figure 6.8: The Optitrack body suit with retroreflective markers
6.1.3 Metrics
There were three types of dependent variables. The first was the configuration {VH, VB,
P, S} at which a participant declared a matching sensation of reality. The second consisted
of the transition set—that is, the specific order of improvements that a user chose to move
from one configuration i to another configuration j. The third was the post-experiment
questionnaire that was completed by all participants.
6.1.4 Experimental procedures
6.1.4.1 Pre-experiment
Upon arriving at the lab, participants read an information document, signed an informed-
consent form, and completed a demographic questionnaire. Participants were informed both
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verbally and on paper that they were free to withdraw from the experiment at any time
without giving any reasons. After completing this process, participants put on the Optitrack
suit and underwent a short calibration procedure, after which they donned the Oculus Rift
HMD and began the experiment.
6.1.4.2 Experiment
Participants were seated wearing the HMD, through which they were able to see the
virtual bar when looking around them and the virtual body from a first-person perspective
when looking down. They were also able to see themselves reflected in the mirror in front of
them. The virtual body and the scenario were both at the maximum level during this first
exposure. Participants were first instructed to look around the room and describe what they
saw. They were instructed to move their arms and legs, and to observe these motions both
directly and in the mirror in front of them; this was done to establish a sense of embodiment
in the virtual body. After that, they were instructed to play with the ball they had between
their feet, which was also at the highest level of coherence. Participants were then shown the
highest level of coherence of the conversation between the other virtual humans.
During this exposure to the highest levels of coherence for all four factors (virtual humans,
virtual body, physical behavior of the ball, scenario) participants were told to focus on the
sensation of reality they were feeling at the moment. They were told that this sensation would
be used a reference for the rest of the experiment and would be referred to as the “optimal
sensation of reality”. Then participants were shown all the decreased levels of coherence for
each of the elements, in the same order as described above: first, the behavior of the virtual
humans, then the behavior of their own virtual body, then the behavior of the ball, and finally
the different levels of scenario coherence. After making sure that the participant understood
all the improvements they could make to affect their sensation of reality, the experimenter
would give the instruction to start the experimental procedure. Participants were told that
they would be playing a game in which the goal was to reach the optimal sensation of reality
they experienced at the beginning of the experience and that they would earn 5 points each
time they would reach this level of reality. They were also instructed to focus on the elements
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that were their priority for getting closer to this sensation of reality. Participants started
each trial in a random configuration presenting different levels of the elements and were
able to change one element at a time until they reached the optimal level of reality. The
improvements were made by telling the experimenter which factor they wanted to improve.
Similarly, they identified when the optimal sensation of reality was reached by saying so to the
experimenter. Once they had reached the optimal sensation of reality, the next trial would
begin. There were eight trials in total and an average of six changes per trial. Each participant
started from configurations {0,0,0,0}, {1,0,0,0}, {0,1,0,0}, {0,0,1,0}, and {0,0,0,1}, and from
three configurations randomly chosen from the configurations in which two improvements had
already been made. These eight trials were presented in random order. Figure 6.9 illustrates
the configuration space and highlights the possible starting configurations.
6.1.4.3 Post-experiment
After completing the virtual reality portion of the experiment, participants completed a
short post-experiment questionnaire. The whole procedure including information, consent
form signing and questionnaires lasted one hour, and the participants were compensated for
their participation.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Overview
As in (Slater et al., 2010), we make the simplifying assumption that the results of the eight
trials are statistically independent. They cannot be truly independent, as the same participant
carried out each of them, and may have learned from one trial to the next. However, the
design of the experiment was such that each trial started from a different initial configuration,
and so participants were presented with a different set of possible upgrades to choose from in
each trial, and so had to reconsider their prioritieseach time.
In this section, we report on all three measures: which states were identified as matching
the optimal sensation of reality, the order of transitions that each participant chose in each
trial, and participants’ responses to a post-experiment questionnaire.
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Figure 6.9: Markov chain with starting conditions highlighted
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6.2.2 Accepted states
The participants’ task was to improve the various factors until they felt that they had
reached the same “level of reality” they had felt in the best possible configuration, C =
{2,2,2,2}. These accepted states are shown in Figure 6.10. (Only states that were accepted
five or more times are included in the figure, for ease of reading.) Included in that figure
are both the percentage of total accepted configurations that a given configuration makes
up (yellow lines), and also the probability that that configuration was marked as accepted
if it was reached (blue lines). (For example, there were 165 total accepted configurations
recorded. Configuration {2,2,1,2} was accepted 27 times, so it makes up 16.4% of the total
accepted configurations. However, Configuration {2,2,1,2} was only reached 54 times across
all participants. So it was accepted 50% (27/54) of the times it was reached.)
Note that the minimum number of improvements (including improvements which were
part of the starting configuration for a trial) for any state in Figure 6.10 is 5, and in fact the
average number of improvements for all the accepted states included in this figure is 6.90.
This can be seen in the Markov Chain in Figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.10: Accepted configurations and their related probabilities. The blue bars indicate
the probability a configuration was accepted if reached, and the yellow bars indicate the
percentage of total accepted configurations the given configuration made up.
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Figure 6.11: The most commonly accepted configurations shown on the Markov Chain
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6.2.3 Transitions
We constructed a transition probability matrix P from the orders of states chosen by
each participant. Each participant made approximately six improvements in each of eight
trials (that is, six improvements from a starting configuration to a configuration accepted
as matching the optimal sensation of reality), for a total of 936 observed transitions. Note
that by construction (due to the nature of what transitions are allowed at each step) P is a
very sparse matrix, with only 125 non-zero entries in an 81 x 81 matrix. (Recall there are 81
possible configurations, 3 virtual human levels x 3 virtual body levels x 3 physical behavior
levels x 3 environment appearance levels; this configuration space is illustrated in Figure 6.9.)
Given P , we can compute the probability distribution over the configurations for any given
state. If we take as the starting configuration C = {0,0,0,0} (the lowest possible levels for each
factor), then sP yields the probability distribution after one improvement has been made,
sP 2 the probability distribution after two improvements have been made, and sPn after n
improvements. By construction, configuration {2,2,2,2} is absorbing, so the eighth step adds
no information, but we can consider the probability distributions over configurations for the
first seven steps.
Figure 6.12 shows the estimated probability distributions over the functions at each of
the transitions (only probabilities greater than 0.01 are shown, for ease of reading). Figure
6.13 shows the most likely path through the Markov chain. (Note that at transition 4 and at
transition 7, there are two approximately equal maximum probabilities, this is reflected by
highlighting two nodes in the graph at the 4th and 7th levels.)
A clear majority of users chose to immediately upgrade the virtual body twice, in order
to have a fully-tracked virtual body (configuration {0,2,0,0}). Following that, a majority of
users upgraded the environment to level 1, moving out of the abstract environment into the
mismatched environment (configuration {0,2,0,1}). After that, users tended to upgrade either
the behavior of the virtual humans or the behavior of the ball to level 1, followed immediately
by whichever one of those wasn’t chosen first, restoring symmetry at state {1,2,1,1}. Users
then tended to upgrade the environment for a second time {1,2,1,2}, then again were divided
over whether to upgrade the virtual humans or the physics behavior to the second level, before
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finally choosing the other option and reaching state {2,2,2,2}.
6.2.4 Questionnaires
All participants completed a short post-experiment questionnaire. This included a mod-
ified SUS presence questionnaire (Usoh et al., 2000), as well as a series of questions asking
them to rate the factors in order of which had the most impact on their sense of reality, and
to explain why.
6.3 Discussion
6.3.1 The virtual body is the most important factor of Psi.
The importance of the virtual body showed in all measures that were collected: matching
configurations, transition probabilities, and questionnaires. 99.4% of the matched config-
urations (when users declared a configuration to be “equally real” as the initial {2,2,2,2}
configuration) had the virtual body at level 2, and 100% had the body at at least level 1.
When it was possible to improve the virtual body (that is, VB was 0 or 1), users chose to do so
81.2% (281/346 observations) of the time. When the user had no virtual body (VB=0), that
increased to 83.9% (120/143) of the time. Improving the virtual body from VB=0 to VB=1,
and then again from VB=1 to VB=2, were the most common first and second improvements
to be made. And in our post-experiment questionnaire, 90.9% of participants said that the
most important factor to improve was the virtual body. It would seem that having a virtual
body that moves with one’s own body is extremely powerful for convincing a user that, “This
is real.”
6.3.2 Regarding the other factors, it is very important to have them in level 1,
but not necessarily in level 2.
85.5% (141/165) of accepted configurations have every factor at level 1 or higher. Only
three times (out of 165 total accepted configurations) did a participant accept a configuration
where the virtual human behavior was at the lowest level (VH=0), only five times did they
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Figure 6.12: Transition probability distributions for each step n, p = sPn
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Figure 6.13: The most likely path taken through the Markov chain, based on the probability
distributions shown in Figure 6.12
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accept a configuration where the environment was at level 0, and only 19 times did they ac-
cept with the ball behavior at level 0. So participants very much wanted the virtual humans
to move, but they did not necessarily have to interact with the participant. Similarly, partic-
ipants overwhelmingly rejected the abstract environment, but did not necessarily require the
matched environment, and the ball needed to move realistically, but not necessarily perfectly.
6.3.3 The second most important factor seems to be the scenario coherence.
This preference is less strong than the virtual body being most important, but the transi-
tion probability distributions show that after improving the virtual body twice, participants
then choose to upgrade the environment a slight majority (51.2%) of the time. Also, after
reaching configuration {1,2,1,1}, participants tended to upgrade the environment for a second
time a plurality of the time (41.4%), more than twice as often as any other option for the
sixth improvement (starting from {0,0,0,0}; if the participant started a trial in any other
configuration, one or two improvements had already been chosen for them). Note that this is
not just about the visual quality or complexity of the environment, but also the appropriate-
ness of the environment to the scenario presented. Levels 1 and 2 of the environment were
designed to be of approximately equal visual quality and complexity. Participant comments
such as, “Depending on the conversation that I heard, the environment was important to
establish it as real,” “. . . [D]epending on the conversation, it was more clear what kind of
bar would fit better,” and “Level 1 was simply too elegant for some football fans with their
team shirts,” seem to indicate that this design was at least partially successful, and that
participants considered the totality of the scenario and not merely the visual quality.
6.3.4 Response to the ball was not the same for all participants, but was very
important for those participants who interacted with it extensively.
Despite the instructions being the same for all participants, there was a wide range of
participant behaviors relating to the ball. Some participants barely looked at it, or touched
it once or twice, just to see how realistic its motion was, before ignoring it for the rest of the
trial. (This was reflected in participant comments such as, “I considered [the ball’s] presence
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irrelevant,” or “I had to forget about the other things to focus on the ball because it was at
my feet.”) However, some participants interacted with the ball extensively and considered the
quality of the ball’s movement to be very important. One participant actually rated it as the
single most important factor, saying “. . . even if my body could be deformed or incomplete,
the movement of the ball gave me the idea that that place was governed by physical laws
similar to those of reality.”
Anecdotally, male participants seemed to interact with the ball more than female partici-
pants did. This is reflected in the accepted configuration data. Males and females accepted the
virtual humans, virtual body, and environment at strikingly similar rates. However, males
accepted configurations that had the ball’s behavior at level 2 63.8% of the time (51/80),
while females accepted such configurations only 38.8% of the time (33/85). (Note that this
difference was almost entirely in level 1, which females accepted 49.4% of the time, and males
accepted only 25% of the time. Both genders accepted the ball at level 0 roughly 11% of
the time.) Using Fisher’s exact test, this difference is significant, with two-tailed p=0.0018.
Also, the most commonly accepted configuration among males was {1,2,2,2}, while the most
commonly accepted configuration among females was {2,2,1,2}. For reference, the accepted
configurations for both male and female users are split out in Figure 6.14.
Figure 6.14: Accepted configurations and their related probabilities, split by gender. The
blue bars indicate the probability a configuration was accepted if reached, and the yellow
bars indicate the percentage of total accepted configurations the given configuration made
up.
This difference is also somewhat supported by the questionnaire data, as only two (of
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eleven) females said that the ball was the first or second most important factor, while five (of
ten) males said that the ball was the first or second most important factor.
6.3.5 Participants who reported lower presence were more likely to accept the
ball at level 0 or level 1 than participants who reported higher presence.
As part of the post-experiment questionnaire, participants completed a modified Slater-
Usoh-Steed questionnaire with five questions. From this information, we divided the popula-
tion into those who had low presence—0, 1, or 2 responses of 6 or 7 on the Likert scale (11
participants)—and those who had high presence—3, 4, or 5 responses of 6 or 7 (10 partici-
pants). As with the male/female split above, these groups accepted configurations with the
ball at level 2 at markedly different rates. The low-presence group accepted configurations
in which the ball was at level 0 or level 1 57.5% of the time (50/87), while the high-presence
group accepted such configurations only 39.7% of the time (31/78). This difference between
the groups is again significant, with two-tailed p=0.029.
The design of the experiment does not enable us to say for certain whether these differences
are correlation or causation, and if the latter, in what direction. However, we speculate that
users who played with the ball more (primarily, but not entirely, male users) interacted more
extensively with the scenario and so felt a higher degree of presence. Then, since playing with
the ball was important to them, they chose not to accept states in which the behavior of the
ball was noticeably unrealistic.
6.4 Conclusion
This study is directly influenced by the study in (Slater et al., 2010), where Slater and
colleagues demonstrated the feasibility of such an experiment, investigating qualia (such as
PI and Psi) using matching experiments similar to those used to determine metamers in color
science. In that paper, they showed that participants given different instructions (to focus on
PI or Psi) chose different matching states and made transitions in different orders.
This experiment builds on that one, focusing exclusively on factors thought to influence
Psi, namely the behavior of other virtual humans in the scenario, the appearance and behavior
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of the participant’s virtual body, the behavior of other objects in the environment, and the
appearance and “scenario-correctness” of the environment itself. Psi has not been previously
investigated in this way, nor have the factors contributing to Psi been delineated before.
The results show that the virtual body is the most powerful contributor to Psi of the four
factors studied in this experiment, and that result holds across matching states, transition
probabilities, and post-experiment questionnaires. This suggests that full-body tracking is
the technology that can contribute most to Psi, and that the body may indeed be the “focal
point where PI and Psi are fused,” as claimed in (Slater, 2009). One thing that is not clear
from this experiment, though, is whether the presence of any self-avatar at all is better than
none, as participants almost universally increased the virtual body to the maximum level at
the earliest opportunity. It is not clear whether participants here actually thought level 1 of
the virtual body was substantially better than level 0, or whether it was merely a necessary
step to get to the ultimately desired state of having a fully-tracked avatar. More research is
needed to answer this question.
This study represents only a first step, intended to further develop our understanding
of the factors of coherence and Psi, which have been comparatively understudied compared
to immersion and PI. A possible next step is to run a similar experiment focusing only on
immersion characteristics of the system, as this experiment focused only on coherence. More
interestingly, one could do an experiment in which participants are prompted to maximize
their feelings of PI and Psi, in which the factors include both coherence and immersion
factors. This could enable us to make practical suggestions as to whether immersion factors
or coherence factors might be more or less important for a given type of task.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions and future work
7.1 Revisiting the thesis statement
In this dissertation,
1. Slater’s concept of Plausibility Illusion has been usefully elaborated by the auxiliary
concepts of virtual scenarios, coherence, and reasonable circumstances, and
2. I have shown the following:
• Plausibility Illusion can be detected using existing presence measures,
• Plausibility Illusion is impacted by individual differences,
• The virtual body is the most important contributing factor to Plausibility Illusion,
and
• The coherence of the scenario is the second most important factor, among those
tested.
In Chapter 1, I presented my novel definitions of several terms related to Plausibility Illu-
sion, namely virtual scenarios, coherence and reasonable circumstances. These terms enable
the discussion of Plausibility Illusion as a concept parallel to Place Illusion by giving it its
own vocabulary.
In Chapter 2, I summarized previous work and showed how it could be unified using the
PI/Psi framework.
In Chapter 3, I fleshed out the concept of Plausibility Illusion and identified some areas
where Plausibility Illusion offers a potential explanation for existing phenomena in the study
of virtual environments, such as the book problem.
In Chapter 4, I presented an experiment that strongly suggested that participant motiva-
tion is one of the individual differences that impacts Psi.
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that data generated from existing presence measures—
namely, the Witmer and Singer Presence Questionnaire (PQ), the Slater-Usoh-Steed ques-
tionnaire (SUS), and physiological measures of arousal—can be affected by each of Place
Illusion, Plausibility Illusion, and the interaction of the two.
In Chapter 6, I demonstrate that users of VEs, namely my study participants engaged in
a virtual football playing task, may interact differently with a virtual environment, and that
these differences are reflected in participants order of improvements in the virtual environment
as well as in their reported presence as measured by the SUS questionnaire.
In Chapter 6, I also demonstrated that the participants, all of whom were directed to
improve their level of Plausibility Illusion, overwhelmingly chose to improve the representation
and behavior of their virtual bodies over other improvements to the virtual scenario. This
suggests that the virtual body is the most important component of a virtual scenario for
eliciting Plausibility Illusion, and the coherence of the scenario is second most important.
Taken as a whole, the results of the study also demonstrate the feasibility of ranking aspects
of a virtual scenario on their importance for eliciting Plausibility Illusion.
7.2 Future research directions building on the reported work
It must be said that we are in the very early days of research about Plausibility Illusion.
Hence the available future work is broad and extensive. It ranges from VR-focused research
to further work in cognitive neuroscience to new interactions with content creators. All of
these directions, like this dissertation, have the goal of improving the design, development,
and evaluation of virtual experiences.
7.2.1 Evaluating immersion and coherence together
The Chapter 6 is, to my knowledge, the first attempt at establishing a priority order
for factors of coherence in immersive virtual environments. It, however, says nothing about
factors of immersion. A similar order-establishing study should be done, with a theoretically
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grounded set of immersion factors, to begin developing such an ordering for immersion factors.
Beyond that, though, the more interesting problem is developing a combined ranking of
immersion and coherence factors in virtual scenarios. For example, is wider field of view more
or less important than a fully tracked virtual body? Are passive haptics more or less important
than coherence of physical interactions? The method pioneered by Slater (Slater et al., 2010)
and continued in Chapter 6 provides a methodology for answering these questions, and many
other similar ones, about virtual environment systems. As more and more elements are ranked
against each other, we would develop a comprehensive guide of which system characteristics
provide the most “bang for the buck” when designing a VE installation or scenario. Given
results such as Zimmons’s black-and-white Pit environment (Zimmons, 2004) (Zimmons and
Panter, 2003) (in which the Pit produced similar physical stress responses and responses on
presence questionnaires regardless of whether it was rendered in low lighting quality, or even
when rendered as only a black and white grid with no shading), I suspect that immersion
factors are largely “good enough” at the moment, and that coherence factors may actually
be more important for improving today’s virtual scenarios.
7.2.2 Developing metrics that can measure Place Illusion and Plausibility Illu-
sion separately
In this dissertation (Chapter 5) I have shown that both Place Illusion and Plausibility
Illusion affect measures developed to measure presence in virtual environments. In addition,
I showed that several subscores of the Witmer and Singer Presence Questionnaire respond
differently to high and low levels of immersion and coherence. However, I did not identify a
metric that would respond to only Place Illusion or only Plausibility Illusion. Such instruments
are necessary to push research forward in this area, and to test some of the hypotheses
put forward in this paper. For example, if instruments existed to measure these constructs
separately, it would be possible to test my hypothesis about the origin of the book problem
(Chapter 3). In addition, the lack of such measures keeps us from measuring the strength of
the interaction between PI and Psi.
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7.2.3 Priming and Plausibility Illusion
As I argued in Chapter 3, I believe that appropriate priming can increase Psi, and therefore
presence, by reducing or eliminating “wrong” (or, I would argue, unanticipated) events in the
VE which can cause breaks in Psi. There has been some prior work investigating priming
in virtual environments (Nunez and Blake, 2003) (Steinicke et al., 2009), but it has not yet
been investigated as a way to improve the perceived coherence in an “unrealistic” virtual
environment, such as a science fiction or fantasy scenario. Lessons could be drawn from, for
example, the design of theme park rides. As the keynote speaker at SIGGRAPH 2006, Joe
Rohde commented on how Disney Imagineers design the waiting areas for attractions such
that patrons are being primed to be in the right state of mind to enjoy the ride before they
even get on it (Rohde, 2006).
7.2.4 The neurobiological basis for Plausibility Illusion
In (Seth et al., 2012), Seth and colleagues present a neurocognitive model of presence based
on minimizing interoceptive prediction error—that is, they propose that presence is elicited
when predictions about the internal state of the body, such as balance or proprioception, are
accurate. What they label as presence in Figure 7.1 would seem to be Place Illusion, given
that it is composed of interoceptive state and predictions about consequences of sensory
input generated by motor control signals (roughly, sensorimotor contingencies). Part of their
evidence for this model is the brain activity of patients suffering from depersonalization (loss of
subjective sense of reality of the self) and derealization (loss of subjective sense of reality of the
world). While the authors discuss these both as failures of conscious presence, it seems likely
to me that they represent failures of Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion, respectively. Can
this model can be amended to differentiate between Place Illusion and Plausibility Illusion?
How?
7.2.5 Collaborations with media creators and game developers
Whereas Plausibility Illusion may be understudied by virtual environments researchers
to this point, that does not mean that no one has been thinking about developing coherent
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scenarios. For game developers, authors, artists, screenwriters, trainers, directors, costume
and set designers crafting a coherent world is the life’s work. Surely they have intuitions
as to which aspects of a scenario are absolutely critical to get right, and which can be (or
perhaps even should be) omitted or modified in the effort to create a coherent world. Surely
we researchers can use their expertise to guide our research. And similarly, our research can
guide the nascent virtual reality game developers and “film” makers.
7.2.6 Storytelling in virtual environments
This dissertation addressed scenario coherence as just one of several factors influencing
Plausibility Illusion in virtual scenarios. However, in scenarios where narrative is important,
it may in fact be the most important factor. Novels have centuries of narrative convention
that can be drawn upon to help structure a story; films have a century of cinematographic
and editing techniques that can be used to convey meaning. Such techniques do not yet exist
for creating compelling immersive scenarios. Further research into scenario coherence may
inform effective means for telling stories in immersive virtual environments.
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Figure 7.1: An interoceptive predictive coding model of conscious presence. Both agency
and presence components comprise state and error units; state units generate control sig-
nals (Aout, Pout) and make predictions [Apred, Ppred, Apred(p)] about the consequent incoming
signals (Ain, Pin); error units compare predictions with afferents, generating error signals
[Aerr, Perr, Aerr(p)]. In the current version of the model the agency component is hierar-
chically located above the presence component, so that it generates predictions about the
interoceptive consequences of sensory input generated by motor control signals. [adapted
from (Seth et al., 2012)]
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APPENDIX A
Bayesian statistics and JAGS
Throughout this dissertation, I have analyzed (and in several cases, re-analyzed) data using
Bayesian statistical methods. This is in contrast to traditional, or frequentist, statistics. For
this reason, I do not report p values, preferring instead to report the posterior probability
that a hypothesis is true (or false), and allow the reader to make up their own mind about
my conclusions.
A.1 A (very brief) introduction to Bayesian statistics
Bayesian statistics is founded upon Bayes’ Theorem:
P (Θ|y) = p(Θ)× p(y|Θ)
p(y)
(A.1)
This can be restated as, the posterior probability of parameter Θ given observed data y equals
Prior probability of Θ× Likelihood of y given Θ / Marginal likelihood of y. Or, more briefly:
Posterior =
Prior × Likelihood
Marginal Likelihood
(A.2)
Or even more briefly (since the marginal likelihood p(y) is just a normalizing constant):
Posterior ∝ Prior × Likelihood (A.3)
So, in Bayesian statistics, we are computing the posterior probability distribution of a
parameter given the prior probability distribution (which may be known or may be estimated)
and the observed data from our experiment.
A.2 Advantages of using Bayesian statistics
This section is informed by and adapted in part from (Dablander, 2015).
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A.2.1 The result is a probability distribution
This has the advantage of matching the way that we normally reason about probabilities.
We may have data that says, for example, that NBA players are 79 inches tall, on average
(Basketball Reference, 2016). Intuitively, we know that this doesn’t mean that all NBA
players are likely to be exactly 79 inches tall. Some will be, like Wesley Johnson (Reddit,
2015). Some, like Stephen Curry, are only 75 inches tall. Others, like, Dirk Nowitzki, are 84
inches tall. In fact, the probability distribution for NBA player height is shown in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Distribution of heights for all NBA players in 2015, overlaid with a normal
distribution, µ = 79.1, σ = 3.46 (data from basketball-reference.com)
Since we have this probability distribution, it is very natural to ask questions about it.
For example, if you wanted to compute the probability that any given NBA player is more
than 78 inches tall, that is simply
110
∫ ∞
78
1
3.46
√
2pi
e
− (x−79.1)2
2×3.462 dx (A.4)
which yields 62.5%. Or if you wanted to know how likely a given NBA player is either less
than six feet or more than seven feet tall, you could compute that as
∫ 72
−∞
1
3.46
√
2pi
e
− (x−79.1)2
2×3.462 dx+
∫ ∞
84
1
3.46
√
2pi
e
− (x−79.1)2
2×3.462 dx (A.5)
which yields 9.89%.
So, since Bayesian analysis yields a probability distribution, it more closely matches how
we tend to think about probability, and it more naturally lends itself to analyses. Given a
p value, you can’t easily ask how likely it is that your parameter is greater than 12 but less
than 37. Given a probability distribution, you can.
A.2.2 Inclusion of prior evidence
The inclusion of a prior makes Bayesian statistics much more well-behaved in the presence
of small sample sizes and “extreme” samples, such as those where an outcome is observed in
100% (or 0%) of the samples. If one flipped a coin twice times and it came up heads both
times, frequentist statistics would suggest that it is 100% likely to come up heads on the next
trial, having no concept of a prior probability distribution. In Bayesian statistics, one might
have a prior that heads should come up 50% of the time. In that case, the observed data
would result in a posterior probability of 75%: greater than 50% (it might be a weighted coin,
after all), but certainly not 100%.
A.2.3 “The illusion of objectivity”
While it may not initially seem so, p values are inherently subjective in a variety of subtle
ways (Berger and Berry, 1988). Eric-Jan Wagenmakers (Wagenmakers, 2007) has helpfully
categorized p-value problems into three categories.
Firstly, p values depend on data that were never observed. Computing the p value depends
on the sampling distribution of the test statistic, given that the null hypothesis H0 holds.
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To obtain this sampling distribution, one assumes that the H0 holds exactly over many
hypothetical replications of the experiment. p is then computed by taking the sum of the
observed value as well as all of these hypothetical replications that are at least as extreme as
the observed value. As stated by Sir Harold Jeffreys, “What the use of P implies, therefore,
is that a hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted observable
results that have not occurred. This seems a remarkable procedure” (Jeffreys, 1961).
Secondly, p values depend on possibly unknown subjective intentions of the experimenter.
For example, consider the case where the test statistic is the number of true responses to
exactly ten true/false questions. Now consider the case where the test statistic is the number
of true responses to true/false questions obtained before the third false response. Now, the
sequence {T, T, F, T, T, T, F, T, T, F} can be observed under either of these sampling
plans, but they will generate different p values. If the sampling plan is unknown, p cannot be
computed correctly.
Thirdly, p values do not quantify statistical evidence. Two experiments with the same
p value but different sample sizes provide different strengths of evidence against the null
hypothesis.
Bayesian statistics, on the other hand, is up front with its assumptions. The posterior
distribution is based on the data and the prior. As long as the prior is specified, the method
is completely open to inspection.
A.2.4 Optional stopping
In traditional statistics, once one has decided on a sample size, one cannot stop early.
Conversely, if you’ve run your full sample size, you cannot simply run more participants. In
either case, the p value you calculate for the “new” sample size will not be accurate. In
Bayesian statistics, you can recompute the posterior probabilities after every participant, and
simply use those as the prior probability for analysis of the subsequent participants. There
is no mathematical problem associated with deciding to run more or fewer participants once
the experiment has begun.
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A.3 Computing posterior probabilities using JAGS
In this dissertation, all Bayesian analyses were performed using the software package JAGS
(Plummer, 2003), which was used with MATLAB via the MATJAGS toolkit, http://psiexp.
ss.uci.edu/research/programs_data/jags/. In this method of analysis, all variables are
considered as part of a single overall model, where all the stochastic equations are evaluated
simultaneously, rather than one at a time. The result is a joint posterior distribution for
all model parameters. The prior distributions on all variables were intentionally chosen to
be non-informative (normal distributions with variance 1000), so as not to bias the results
unduly.
To summarize the method, one begins by expressing the observed dependent variables
as a function of the independent variables. For example, there would be an equation for
each dependent variable for each participant. The initial values of the model parameters
are stochastically sampled from the specified prior distributions for each parameter (sampled
from a normal distribution with large variance, in this case), and the system of equations is
then simultaneously solved to minimize overall error. This solution generates a single value
of each model parameter. The process is repeated a large number of times (here 50,000),
with different initial values each time. By doing so, one stochastically generates a posterior
probability distribution, composed of the 50,000 solved-for values, for each model parameter.
The following pseudocode illustrates this model.
for run = 1 to 50000
# Populate a system of equations, one per DV per participant
for i = 1 to number_of_participants
for j = 1 to number_of_dependent variables
# y is a stochastic variable, sampled from a normal distribution with
# mean mu and variance 1/tau
y[i][j] ~ dnorm(mu[i][j], tau[j])
# mu is a deterministic node, equal to its RHS
mu[i][j] <- a[j][0] + a[j][1]*x1 + + a[j][k]*x_k
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end
end
# Initialize all parameters from their prior distributions
for j = 1 to number_of_dependent_variables
for k = 0 to number of independent_variables
# All coefficients are sampled randomly
a[j][k] ~ dnorm(0, 0.001)
# The exact value of tau is also sampled randomly
tau[j] ~ dgamma(0.001, 0.001)
end
end
Sample stochastic variables
Solve this system of equations by Markov chain Monte Carlo
end
Unlike traditional null-hypothesis testing, there is no single value such as a p-value that
determines whether the result is significant. Instead, we report the posterior probabilities and
readers are free to interpret those probabilities for themselves. Posterior probabilities near
50% indicate that both outcomes are approximately equally likely, so we refer to posterior
probabilities between 50% and 70% as offering negligible evidence for the stated hypothesis.
Similarly, for convenience, we refer to probabilities above 70% as offering little evidence in
favor of a hypothesis, 75% as offering some evidence, probabilities above 80% as good evidence,
and probabilities above 90% as strong evidence. (These probabilities can also be less than
50%, providing evidence in the corresponding way for the inverse hypothesis.) This manner
of describing the results follows Bergstro¨m et al. (Bergstro¨m et al., 2016).
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